NEW DEVELOPMENTS OF EU EXTERNAL SECURITY POLICY

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Contents :

ACRONYMS:

'EUMS' : the European Union and its MS

'EU-MS' or 'MS' : the MS of the EU

'EU' :   the European Union

'ISP' :   Internal Security Policy, including Justice Policy, used in a generic sense

'HA' or 'JHA': Home Affairs, or Justice and Home Affairs, used in a generic sense

'FSJ' :   Freedom, Security and Justice, designating subject matter of the EU policies referring to
             Internal Security

'ESP' : External Security Policy, used in a generic sense

'CFSP': the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy

'CSDP': the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy

Foreword

The new 'Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy' was submitted to the European Council of June 28-29th 2016, by the High Representative/Vice President (HRVP) of the European Commission Federica Mogherini.[1]

Like the HRVP's 'Strategy', this new FEPS report on the latest developments of the EU's External Security Policy is based firstly on an assessment of this policy as it evolved since Javier Solana's 'A secure Europe in a better world' of 2003, secondly on the changed challenges confronting that policy fourteen years later, and thirdly on the requirements for its future shape seen to flow from assessment and challenges.

One and not the least of these new challenges is the Brexit decision of June 23rd. At the same time, it is the least anticipated one of them, either by the 'Global Strategy' or by this report. Nevertheless, a kind of 'Brexit spirit' has already reigned over the United Kingdom's (UK) shrinking contribution to the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy of the past decades, together with the UK's bilateral security/defence relationships with partners outside and inside the EU. As to that, one need not expect additional dramatic changes from formal Brexit.

The explicit objective of this FEPS report was to avoid what one could call the 'normative' approach, an n-th exercise of telling readers what needed to be done for having a genuine EU security and defence policy. That approach has been over-exploited for decades, and has under-performed, leading to head-nodding approval in political conferences and speeches, and leaving analysts without clues to explain the continuing weaknesses of the EU's real-life CFSP/CSDP or to help them sketch out the preconditions for future advances.

It is that lacuna which this FEPS report is to address by its empirically grounded analysis of the EU's CSDP and its role as one of the security-defence policy options of the EU Member States, hopefully contributing to a more realistic reading of the EU's new 'normative' initiatives to come.

A second FEPS report published simultaneously with the one on External Security Policy turns more explicitly to 'Linking and Overlap between the EU's External and Internal Security Policies'.

Insofar, FEPS concludes that it has submitted a timely and in part sobering 'reading-help' for the coming debate about the new 'Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy' which the HRVP of the European Commission Federica Mogherini has launched with her 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe'.

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[1] European Union (2016), Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, Brussels

Summary

Can we expect the External Security Policy (ESP) of the European Union (EU) to become a site of deepening integration in the coming years? For that to happen, the MS (MS) would have to introduce tangible, qualitative steps of more mutually binding common decision-making and of more community solidarity in their Common Security and Defence Policy. The answer of this report is that MS will in all probability not agree to that sort of transfer, in the short to medium term.

Up to the year 2015, MS engaged in external security policy cooperation at three levels, the North Atlantic Alliance, the United Nations, and the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), contributing in each case with forces and demanding their part in decision-making. For France and the UK one has to add the option of unilateral ope-rations plus ad-hoc coalitions. New challenges have emerged especially in the East, from Russia's aggressions, and in the South and South-East of the European continent, from failing states, civil wars and insurgencies especially in Africa, and extremist Islamic terrorism. If these challenges themselves are not likely to impact Europe directly, their consequences do and give cause for external security measures.

But MS do not in the first place choose the EU to deal with these challenges. For the Russian state-to-state challenge of a modern military power, they choose NATO. For the South-Eastern challenges of much lesser military quality, France and sometimes the UK act alone or in coalition with the US, as they also do in Africa, even for high-intensity confrontation scenarios. For reacting to the largest-scale challenges in the South, the European Union and its MS (EUMS) choose the United Nations cooperation format. And only for the relatively least dangerous operations of crisis-management with low-level expected violence, limited dimensions and increasingly with purely civilian objectives and instruments, will they –or rather the willing ones among them– choose the CFSP/CSDP cooperation format, while also only devoting to it the relatively smallest force, compared to what they contribute to NATO, the UN, or their unilateral operations.

Vis-à-vis the new challenges, each one of these cooperation formats continues in the year 2015 to function and none gives MS governments cause for serious concerns. NATO shows signs of gaining new vitality. The EUMS appear to be satisfied with this assortment of well-adapted options and not keen to put it, and their sovereign freedom of choice in external security policy, at risk, for the uncertain chance of an untried scheme of Europeanising their defence. Anyhow there is an accessible option with which the EUMS could gain a supplement of defence capacities for CSDP, and for NATO, without ceding more sovereignty: increase their defence spending.

Even if CFSP/CSDP suffers of a number of serious deficiencies, it too is capable of functioning with a status-quo structure and of putting the missions in the field that the EUMS want. Only if they were to want stronger military missions, deployable at shorter notice, for higher intensity conflicts, and for more ambitious work on the root causes of threats, would they need to actually change. There again, more national defence spending would already carry them a certain stretch. But first of all the EU MS would need to find a consensus on what kind of tasks they want or need to add to CSDP's vector.

Introduction

This report is to inquire about new developments in the EU's security policies. How do they evolve under the pressure of new challenges confronting European states and societies? Does Russia's aggression against the Ukraine and its threatening behaviour against other neighbours, do the civil wars in the Arab world and in Africa, impose adaptations on the EU's external security policy? A precondition for reactions of that kind would have to be that the EU already has security policies that could adapt. Are there such policies? The second question is easier to answer than the first one. The following report will start out with looking at the status quo before turning to the new developments of today and tomorrow.

Integration of 'Core Powers'?

The Standard View: Impossible to Integrate

Security policy belongs to the "core powers" of states. As the sociologist Max Weber asserted in a famous treatise of 1922, the central criterion of defining a state is its successfully maintained monopoly of the legitimate use of physical coercion, i.e. of the ultimate instrument of internal and external security policy.[2] In their debate about the forces shaping European integration, scholars have viewed these powers as belonging to the realm of "high politics", to use the well-known term of Stanley Hoffmann in the 1960s.[3]

In this debate, core- or high politics powers have normally been considered to be the most difficult, if not impossible, to integrate among EU MS. By the end of the 20th century, EU integration had extended to most of the policy areas linked to its original common market project, and been capped with the first full integration of a core power, the replacement of national currencies by the Euro and the creation of the European Central Bank.

If many scholars considered it –at that point in time– to have reached a kind of steady state,[4] where it was not any more likely to advance (in depth and scope), this reasoning had an important source in the idea that the next logical integration steps would need to address security policies. But security policies were high politics and insofar supposed to be integration-resistant. In this interpretation, EU MS would remain the masters of security policies at least for the foreseeable future, even if public debates and apparent necessities seemed to render this role/competence less and less in line with current needs.

This view also appeared to conform to realities. Since the failure of the European Defence Community project more than half a century ago, in 1954, the Europeanisation of security policy competences among EU MS has been blocked or at best progressed haltingly or at a snail's pace, especially as compared to the central economic, regulatory and so on policies of the EU.

A Dynamic Perspective

If this has been and remains the "standard view" of the majority of EU integration scholars, alternative minority views have never completely disappeared, holding on to more dynamic interpretations of European integration, of which the functionalist and neo-functionalist ones have certainly

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[2] WEBER, Max (1922, 1978), Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1978, p.54

[3] HOFFMANN, Stanley (1966), Obstinate or obsolete ? The fate of the nation-state and the case of Western-Europe. In : Daedalus (95)3, p.862-915

[4] MORAVCSIK, Andrew (2005), The European constitutional compromise and the neo-functionalist legacy, in : Journal of European Public Policy 12(2), p.349-386

remained the most potent variants. In recent years it would appear that especially the build-up of new fiscal-economic governance in the Euro-zone as a consequence of the common currency and the financial crisis of 2008 and beyond, has shaken the certainties of the 'steady state' adherents. After all, fiscal policy was considered a core power of states as well. If it could be europeanised by the irresistible spillover from the financial crisis, then the chances of more European cooperation in security policies might get a more optimistic reading in their turn.[5] And in fact, a substantial *acquis* of European security policies does exist. Further down we will try to sum it up in a number of relevant sectors, by looking at what EU research calls 'enablers': the institutions, rules and procedures through which MS implement policies in an EU-treaty-bound intergovernmental or integrated manner. But in fact, this *acquis* stands alongside other non-EU cooperation formats that EU MS choose for ensuring their national security and defence.

The Research Question

The dynamic vision of integration permits to consider European security policies as part of a dynamic process which may very well carry them forward to higher levels of integration. On the other hand, the 'standard vision' justifies a prudent and sceptical approach for this analysis which accepts as point of departure the hypothesis that in security policy –internal and external– the EU MS do indeed remain the masters for the time being.

 First we want to gain a deeper understanding of two interlinked aspects of EU Security Policy: which cooperation mode do the individual EU MS choose in their quest for defending their external security and which is the ranking for EU cooperation that results from those choices? In a following step we want to interpret these choices in terms of European Integration: Do they amount to an advance of European Integration in the policy of external security and defence?

We will start from the status-quo reached in the New Century, after the year 2000.

Benchmarks of policy integration in the EU

For assessing integration advance in the EU's external security and defence policy, we need benchmarks, paying attention to the normative and empirical aspects. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) gives normative clues in articles 23 to 46 TEU on the EU CFSP, and more specifically article 42 to 44 TEU on the EU CSDP.

It has brought a number of innovations as compared to the Nice Treaty. One of them being the affirmation that "The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides" (art 42§2). A second one being a clause of mutual support in case of armed aggression against a Member state (art 42§7). These are ambitious normative benchmarks which would appear to invite the MS to substantial further advances of EU external security policy.

But this benchmark is clearly put into perspective in the next clauses of the same article 42. They also affirm that the MS remain masters of the specific manner in which they conduct their defence (art 42 §7). And they confirm the predominant place of NATO –and not the CSDP– as the regional defence policy cooperation structure of most EU MS, a NATO "which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation." (art 42 §7). More specifically still, under article 42§1, CSDP is only to take action outside EU territory. The

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[5] Cf. as a recent example GENSCHEL, Philipp & JACHTENFUCHS, Markus (Ed.), Beyond the Regulatory Polity. The European Integration of Core State Powers, Oxford 2014, presenting a number of papers purporting to demonstrate the reality and the determinants of core policies' integration.

exact wording of §2 in combination with §7 prevents the EU (not its individual MS!) from collective self-defence –or 'territorial defence'– within the framework of the CSDP, "unless the Treaty is amended or the European Council decides unanimously on the establishment of common defence in accordance with Article 42§2 TEU. In this sense also, NATO is the primary organisational venue for MS to exercise collective self-defence".[6]

Thus, in effect the normative benchmark is divided in two contradictory options. On the one hand the explicit and ambitious future perspective of a common EU defence with obligatory mutual support against outside aggression, on the other the equally explicit priority accorded to the existing NATO-membership and –loyalty of most of the EU MS, expressly underlined by the Lisbon treaty. The treaty text leaves no doubt that the first of the two is the one which reflects the EU's own inherent development logic, and that the second one just allows for the weight of an external variable which may disappear in the future. Nevertheless, this second option puts the first one considerably in perspective.[7]

The empirical clues must be sought by looking at the internal structures of mature federal states, for instance in Europe and America. In fact, they contradict the principles governing the EU's external security policy. Because everywhere in the world the federal norm is for the *external* security and defence policy to be highly centralised, as opposed to the prevalent de-centralisation of *internal* security policies.[8]

Compared to this empirical benchmark, and to the first of the two normative options, the EU's CSDP is still very far below the objective to which it could and should reasonably aspire.[9] In order to become more comparable to the integration level of mature federal states' defence policies, very large changes would still be necessary. And in consequence every step of additional EU SDP cooperation could well be considered an advance of EU integration in this field.

But compared to this same empirical benchmark and the one set by the second normative option which consists in holding on to the EU MS' existing NATO-adherence, the CSDP has attained –in the eyes of many–a largely adequate level. For them, future advances might very well strengthen EU Integration but put the purported objective of that deepening at risk, i.e. a tangible gain of common military security, if it were to be reached at the expense of loosening the alliance with the United States under the roof of NATO.

An appraisal of cooperation advances in defence policy can thus first try to take both benchmarks at once into account, and only applaud advances which would still further improve the CSDP cooperation between EU MS, but simultaneously also improve –or at least not damage– their ability to comply with their NATO obligations. This would be a path-constant interpretation.

On the other hand it can only apply the yardstick of CSDP-deepening, even at the expense of NATO's viability. This would be a path-changing evaluation. For this to happen, a drastic re-calculation of defence policy interests in EU MS capitals would need to come about beforehand. Otherwise, NATO's

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[6] CÎRLIG, Carmen-Cristina (2015), The EU's mutual assistance clause: the provisions of Article 42(7)TEU, in: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing November 2015. Other authors concur with this position.

[7] This is certainly not the rule as to other treaty obligations which MS 'brought with them' in the moment of accession to the EU. Cf. Art.351 TFEU which exhorts MS to eliminate any incompatibilities between the latter and the EU Treaty obligations.

[8] R.Daniel KELEMEN, "Building the New European State? Federalism, Core State Powers, and European Integration," in *Beyond the Regulatory Polity? The European Integration of Core State Powers*, ed. Philipp & JACHTENFUCHS GENSCHEL, Markus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). P.215-6

[9] This is reflected already in the numbers of EU MS' soldiers deployed for NATO missions as compared to CSDP missions. For Germany in 2016 this is ca. 1700 compared to 580, with a further ca. 800 serving under UN-flag.

and the US' alliance promise to the EU MS would have to lose its value. Therefore, the task of the External Security Policy-integration remains in fact much more daunting than that concerning Internal Security Policy.

The one strategy theoretically promising to satisfy both benchmarks by offering a positive result along a path-constant interpretation, as well as results in line with the path-changing interpretation, appears to be the time-honored and never truly implemented concept of erecting an EU pillar within NATO, standing besides the US, Canada, and Turkey.[10] Soutou has described this as a Gaullist conception: "a strong system of military cooperation among (the EU MS), which would then, as a group, conclude agreements with Washington". One could argue that NATO's EU MS already implement something resembling a European Pillar: CSDP. But this takes place out-of-NATO, out-of-area and without the US as well.

"Pillar", "European" and an intact "NATO" have manifestly been impossible to re-unite in one single institution up to 2016. Chances along that line remain extremely slim. One crucially important barrier has always been strategic dissent between the EU's 'Big Three'.

Key Elements of EU MS' External Security and Defence Policy

In the introduction to this report we said that we would start our analysis of new EU Security Policies at the level of the EU MS, given that the largest part of competences in these areas still remained with them. This will put the CSDP's place and advances into proper perspective.

The MS:

- Retain the sole competence and the physical means to conduct a security-defence policy with armed forces;
- Large MS retain the largest and most autonomous coercive tools, and a dominant influence in EU decision-making on external security policy and coalition building;
- Assume the (largest part of the) material/financial, and the personnel risk of their participation in coercive conflictual CSDP missions;
- For most if not all EU MS, especially the larger ones, CSDP constitutes only the less important cooperation framework for their external security policy, especially as concerns its coercive component.

The EU MS' External Security Policies are composite constructions, the result of very different combinations of their national security policy assets with other European and non-European states, over different stations in the timeline of responding to specific security and defence challenges. Given that Security and Defence policies are a sovereign reserve of EU MS, they decide themselves somewhere on the policy timeline, how and with which tool to respond to a given Security and Defence policy challenge/issue.

Challenges, the Developments of 2014-15

EU MS confront and take part in international security policies and conflicts, in using or not these different options for regional cooperation. We will see which place they give to the CSDP option.

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[10] SOUTOU, Georges-Henri (2010), The Fifth Republic and NATO : Odd Man out or the only Country in Step ? in : HANHIMÄKI, SOUTOU, GERMOND (Eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Security, Milton Park, pp.58-73, p.67

Further up this report already mentioned the research of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which had recorded "an uneven, yet clearly visible upward trend" of conflicts in the last decade." In particular, the number of conflicts involving troops from other states, so called internationalised conflicts, has increased. In 2014, the conflict in Syria and the escalating violence in countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria and Ukraine, resulted in the highest yearly death toll in the post-Cold War period and the highest number of armed conflicts since 1999."[11] In 2016 this trend is not likely to change.

These developments reflect the gloomy forecasts of the 2003 Solana Report rather well, but with two big exceptions,

- The first being the new Russian assertiveness and land-grab in Ukraine and farther afield in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.
- The second being the end to the stand-off between Iran and the principal Western powers plus Russia, over the Iranian nuclear program.

Both developments forcefully recalled attention to the persisting reality of inter-state power politics with military means, and the role which large military powers play in them. And the EU's and it's MS' actions and reactions in and vis-à-vis these developments demonstrate some of the basic and persisting patterns in the EU CFSP/CSDP.

Russian aggression in Ukraine

Indeed the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and Russia's ensuing substantial military support of the East-Ukrainian armed insurgents has frightened governments and populations of the Ukraine's most immediate Western neighbours and around the Black Sea, and especially the Baltic states and Poland. They fear at best a continuation of Russian pressure on Ukraine and at worst an extension of Russian asymmetric warfare to one or the other of their own group. Therefore they have asked for demonstrations of reassurance from their friends and military alliance partners in the NATO and EU.[12]

In Western European countries such concerns appear almost inexistent. Opinion polls and the absence of official declarations of alarm demonstrate that clearly enough. In fact the EU and it's Western MS have been at pains neither to dramatise the threat emanating from Russia nor the coercive character of the EU's sanctions most of them ostensibly "not directed at 'Russia' or it's people", but only at (until the downing of the Dutch passenger plane) Russian individuals, companies, other organisations or institutions which supported the illegal annexation of Crimea and the separatist insurgency forces in Ukraine.[13] Russian aggression is as yet not perceived as a challenge to the economic interests of the biggest EU powers' elites. Rather, the EU-initiated sanctions are seen to create that challenge. This position is understandable to a point because "Putin's assertion of a right to defend Russian speakers beyond his borders …. falls short of the global ideological confrontation with communism. In fact other threats have appeared sufficiently grave to Western European states and the US that they did not want to return to all-out confrontation with Russia. …. Moscow and the West have continued to cooperate on issues such as curbing Iran's nuclear

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[11] Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Date of retrieval: 2015/08/14) UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: www.ucdp.uu.se/database, Uppsala University

[12] The nordic and baltic states deplore 'unisono' the degradation of the regional security situation, because of military tensions originating in Russia, cf. OPITZ, Christian, Potentiale der nordisch-baltischen Sicherheitskooperation, SWP-Aktuell 69, July 2015, p.1; also the recent PEW Research Center public opinion survey of June 10, 2015, http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/10/nato-publics-blame-russia-for-ukrainian-crisis-but-reluctant-to-provide-military-aid/

[13] GALBERT, Simond de (2015), A Year of Sanctions against Russia – Now What?, A Report of the CSIS Europe Program, London October 2015

programme and disarming Syria of chemical weapons despite the conflict in Ukraine."[14] Likewise, "Mediterranean NATO allies, who see the main threats to their security in instability in Africa and the Middle East, are eager to maintain a dialogue with Russia and avoid any return to a purely Cold War posture."[15] Finally, as already underlined, Russia does cooperate in a number of EU CSDP missions and obviously finds this to its interest and intends to continue doing so.[16]

Summing up, most significantly for our report, Russian aggression being principally limited to the South-Eastern tip of Europe, it is not yet perceived as a challenge to the security of Western European citizens or its economy. In consequence, its relevance for our analysis is only limited.

The Western European MS' reaction, significantly influenced by the German government, has consisted of five elements,

- First, a very low key of the EU's communication concerning the military component of any dissuasive measures vis-à-vis Russia.
- Second, EU MS' contributions to that military deterrence made in their quality as members of NATO. NATO decided on its 2014 September summit in Wales a „Readiness Action Plan" to improve the reaction time of NATO's Response Force NRF and increase NATO presence in Central European NATO Members by new rotating troop detachments and increased exercise contributions from Western NATO members. Germany's Bundeswehr also "shifted its center of gravity to NATO's Eastern flank."[17] This constitutes a clear-cut line-up with NATO's and the US' alliance reassurances to the Baltic states and Poland, but also a refusal of Baltic, Polish or US governments' demand, to arm the Ukraine.
- Third a clear choice of the mildest "preventive" instrument of coercion, i.e. sanctions. Cf. box.
- Fourth, a strong effort to keep the diplomatic channel open and bind Russia into negotiations, of which some are linked to the sanctions, to build a degree of pressure and simultaneously preserve the dialogue.
- This involves, fifth, the willingness of the continental EU's biggest MS' political leaders, the German chancellor and the French president to engage directly, and enter into binding agreements with the leaders of the Ukraine and of Russia, over ending the Russian-supported insurgency in South-Eastern Ukraine.

Sanctions, called "restrictive measures", are decided on at the level of the CFSP, "Sanctions – also referred to as restrictive measures – against third countries, individuals or entities, are an essential EU foreign policy tool that it uses to pursue objectives in accordance with the principles of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Certain EU measures are imposed by Resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The EU may however decide to apply autonomous measures in addition to the UN's measures or adopt restrictive measures autonomously. In general terms, the EU imposes its restrictive measures to bring about a change in policy or activity by the target country, part of a country, government, entities or individuals. They are a preventive, non-punitive, instrument." (http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/index_en.htm)

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[14] DNA 2014 Ukraine crisis sends NATO 'back to basics': To protect MS against perceived Russian threat Thursday, 14 August 2014 - 7:45pm IST | Place: Paris | Agency: Reuters , Cf. http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report-ukraine-crisis-sends-nato-back-to-basics-to-protect-member-states-against-perceived-russian-threat-2010773

[15] Ibid.

[16] Cf. Russian UNSC representative Churkin, UNSC on March 9 2015 (S/PV 7402), p.15, accessed 08.10.2015

[17] Bundeswehr präsent an der NATO Ostflanke, in: Bundeswehr-Journal 15.08.2015, http://www.bundeswehr-journal.de/2015/bundeswehr-praesent-an-der-nato-ostflanke/#more-5519

This is already a clear indication of an important feature of CFSP, i.e. its preference of choosing –from a comprehensive toolbox that also includes military power– the non-military instruments of crisis diplomacy and economic coercion.

It is a confirmation of the insufficiency of any strategy depending only on the military instrument vis-à-vis the asymmetric warfare that Russia (is supposed to have) conducted and is suspected to continue conducting vis-à-vis its neighbours.

And it is a confirmation of the two-pronged approach which their own NATO membership and the strong American NATO presence permits EU MS to use. Namely within NATO and together with the US playing the role of the 'bad cop' and militarily reassuring the Baltic states, Poland and other Central European states vis-à-vis Russia. And within the EU-frame to play the 'good cop' role of peaceful dialogue and economic coercion.

Finally the eminent role of the continental EU's two biggest powers France and Germany in the EU's external crisis diplomacy is confirmed by the Minsk agreements between Russia, the Ukraine and the two EU leaders, agreements which to this day remain the only texts which engage all four of these states in a solution of the crisis.

On another register the conflict and the EU's approach to it also reflect the geo-political fact of the EU being locked in competition with Russia about the influence over the last remaining uncommitted parts of the post-1990 'cordon sanitaire' between the two sides, a competition which cannot be resolved in a sustainable manner by military means and calls for a political settlement.

Dealing with the security challenge posed by Russia's aggressive/assertive stance vis-à-vis Ukraine has activated 3 registers with the EU External Security Policy:

- Crisis Diplomacy of large EU MS Germany and France vis-à-vis the presidents of Ukraine and Russia, and the insurgents' representatives on the sidelines, supported by the United States;
- EU MS in CFSP Action, by sanctions against Russia, especially supported by the UK and Germany, flanked by US sanctions;
- EU MS in NATO-alliance, by explicit reassurance measures for Central Eastern European EU MS and Ukraine.

Lining up these factors also demonstrates how the CSDP has up to autumn 2015 remained completely absent from these efforts.

The Iran Nuclear Detente

Decisive elements are identical in the EU's participation in the apparently successful Iran nuclear negotiations:

- The eminent role –since 2003– of the EU's most powerful MS, the "E3" Germany, France and UK, only since 2006 coordinated by the EU's HR/VP;
- The cooperative involvement of the United States;
- The role of 'preventive' (the Commission's term) economic coercion;
- The sharing of tasks –since 2006– with the US and the other veto powers of the UN Security Council Russia and China. The whole negotiation format then being called E3/EU+3 plus Iran, or 6+1.

But with certain interesting differences:

- The implication of the EU's and of the global nuclear control and power regimes, Euratom and the IAEA;
- The direct involvement of the United States and its potential military threat against an Iran nuclear armament program.
- The Iran Nuclear control struggle also saw the first ever deployment of a "real cyber weapon", a sabotage software called 'Stuxnet' against Iran's enrichment facilities[18] capable to search, identify, control and destroy a targeted industrial installation.

Again the CSDP has been absent (excepting the so-called 'coordinating role' of the HR/VP on behalf of the EU which merits closer inspection), and other coordination formats –i.e. ad hoc coalition-building– have shown themselves to be the decisive vectors.

Civil Wars and Crisis in the South and South-East of the EU

As the introduction already underlined, paradoxically, the external challenges which have the highest relevance for the specific questions asked in this report, were only in a small part seen to originate in nearby Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and to a much larger part in somewhat more distant regions to the South and South-East of Europe. Indeed it was the violent break-up of nearby Yugoslavia in the early 1990s which provoked the first EU external security-policy mission of 1991, the European Community Monitor Mission(ECMM), and later from 2003-4 the first military CSDP missions in Macedonia (Concordia) and Bosnia-Hercegovina (Althea). But simultaneously, also in 2003 the first big military CSDP mission (Artemis) was already started in Africa, in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

But for this report, it is of key importance to remember that the two first CSDP military missions in Europe were already preceded by NATO military crisis-management missions in the same countries, missions the objective of which already went beyond the alliance's cold-war focus on collective territorial defence of its MS in Europe.[19] They were at once part and proof of the alliance's re-orientation towards a broader scope of mission in terms of tasks and geographic scope. Since then, not only the wars in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, or the decades-old smouldering Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, but also other tensions, armed conflicts, breakdowns of state authority, in (increasingly Muslim) countries of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and Central and South Asia moved to the fore of CSDP attention. Africa continues to be the most unstable continent. This is true for state-based and for non-state conflicts.

The most recent developments from that direction, seen to threaten the external security of EU MS, have been the two bloody terrorist attacks in France in the year 2015: in January against the editorial staff of Charlie Hebdo and on a kosher supermarket in Paris, and in November against hundreds of football fans, restaurant and concert visitors again in the French capital. The Charlie Hebdo attack was claimed by the Yemenite branch of Al Quaeda[20], whereas the supermarket attacker asserted having been directed by Da'esh. Already then the French authorities concluded that these attacks were organised from outside France and constituted foreign aggression. After the terrible November attacks, Da'esh officially claimed responsibility. Investigation showed the

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[18] ZETTER, Kim (2011), How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the most Menacing Malware in History, in: Wired, 07.11.11 , p.3 on print-out, http://www.wired.com/2011/07/how-digital-detectives-deciphered-stuxnet/all/ (last accessed 22.09.15); cf. also http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/06/has-the-u-s-declared-cyber-war-on-iran/
[19] Cf. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm
[20] http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/aqap-vs-isis-who-was-really-behind-charles-hebdo-692115745

ringleader of the attackers to have been a Da'esh member[21] and French president Hollande now officially declared his country to be "at war" with Da'esh, and has intensified air strikes over Da'esh targets in Syria.[22]

Besides the direct attacks against Europeans, instigated by foreign adversaries, a broader challenge has emerged that is destabilising at once the Southern part of the EU's external borders, their EU-determined control and entry regime and the viability of the EU asylum system in general, and that tests the stability of European societies: An irregular migrant movement of dimensions not seen since the end of the Second World War, from Africa and the Arabian peninsula and from South Asia, underpinned to a large measure by large-scale organised crime and by the incapacity or the collusion of foreign governments.

Those are the types of challenges vis-à-vis which the EU MS have indeed begun to employ the tools of the CFSP, introduced into the EU Treaty in Maastricht, of 1992, and since 2003 the military and civilian missions of the CSDP. It is to that specifically European coordination format for MS' Security and Defence Policy that the report will now turn more specifically.

On the one hand, it is the quality and effectiveness of this coordination and its 'EU-integration' content and effect, which will be examined more explicitly under the heading of 'internal enablers'. But on the other hand, its relevance for EU MS, in comparison to the other coordination formats, will continue to be the second key research issue.

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[21] http://www.france24.com/en/20160111-france-november-13-paris-attacks-terrorism-charlie-hebdo-intelligence-security
[22] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34902832

The EU's institutional and procedural responses: Enablers

In the following section, we will differentiate between sets of **external** enablers, acting from outside the EU, which enable and constrain the MS' international action, and the set of **internal** enablers constituted by the CFSP/CSDP framework for the Security and Defence policy cooperation which can properly be called European External Security Policy. Further up, the differentiation of the EU's External security policies in the 21st century was underlined, as to its levels, to its toolboxes, to the mixes of instruments and objectives from one policy to the next.

Internal Enablers

CSDP Institutions and Procedures, and the MS

Conceptualisation

The EU Security and Defence Policy cooperation concerns the procedures, rules and institutions of the Union, of which EU MS can avail themselves to organise and orient that cooperation. It shaped by their governments assembled in the two relevant Council formations, the *European Council*, chaired by its president Donald Tusk, and the *Foreign Affairs and the Defence Council*, chaired by the High Representative/Vice-president of the Commission (HRVP) Federica Mogherini. A third important player is the *European Commission* with its president, because a number of crucially important instruments in the toolbox for coercive measures, like for instance economic sanctions, concern policies for which the Commission retains competence. That is also the case for the totality of the 'comprehensive' instruments to accompany CSDP missions.

Decision-Making

In this second decade of the 21st century a full panoply of politico-military decision-making bodies has been set up at CFSP/CSDP level, including the necessary procedures to take and implement security policy decisions ranging from general orientations down to defining and conducting concrete missions.[23] Experts and practitioners agree that the EU possesses a structure which permits it the planning and implementation of CSDP missions for crisis management, and for peace keeping and – making.

All the same, deciding on EU external security/defence missions continues to depend on decisions in the Council, to be taken in intergovernmental mode, mostly by consensus. In addition, the implementation of each military mission requires the individual engagement of individual MS governments with national funding and forces, governments with segmented external security policies, over and above marked by their national idiosyncrasies. Without their engagement the institutions and procedures remain empty shells.

In spite of the improved structures, important weaknesses remain which are often put forward to justify the reticence of MS to enter into CSDP missions.

1: The Absence of Common Threat Perceptions and Common Answers

The most important precondition to fill these 'shells' with EU MS CSFP/CSDP initiatives is certainly the formation of common threat perceptions, of common interests and of consensual responses, between the MS and especially the most important military powers among them. The first of these responses would have to be the insight into the need for a permanent cooperative approach in

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[23] The permanent political and military structures of this system were created at the European Council of Nice, in December 2000

external security and defense. This insight already is absent. Especially France and the UK with their unilateralist penchants, refuse this argument.

In 2015, geography continues to play a primordial role in determining EU MS' threat perceptions and responses. The external threat perceptions as such remained very different between the EU's MS, North-Eastern on the one hand, and those on the Mediterranean coast on the other – with the first group primarily pre-occupied by the Russian challenge, and the second one by state failures and by Islamic terror movements on the Southern shores of the Mediterranean.

NATO, and not CSDP, is considered the proper answer for the first challenge, mainly by North-Eastern Europe; for the second it is American-led coalitions, preferred by the EU's old colonial powers and Mediterranean coastal states. Germany accepts co-responsibility for battling the root springs of migration in Africa and the Near-East. Here, CSDP does become a tool of preference, but even then often alongside more robust ad-hoc French military interventions.

Not astonishingly, there has not been a new common strategic document or White Book on European Defence, since the first High Representative's 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', of 2003[24]. But there have been often-repeated demands for a newer and possibly more detailed successor document. For 2016, the HR/VP has been tasked with a document of that kind.

2: The absence of permanent groups of closer defence policy cooperation

If defence policy convergence remains elusive for the 28, it might be possible among smaller groups of closer cooperation. But the insufficient convergence of views prevents even formal treaty-bound closer cooperation. The Lisbon Treaty's 'permanent structured cooperation' PSC (TEU Art. 42§6 and 46) has not come about, until 2016. Not even the looser cooperation format of TEU Art. 44 has been applied.

CSDP missions never muster more than a few MS. But these prefer to deploy under the centralised and relatively more cumbersome and bureaucratic direction of the Union institutions, rather than taking the responsibility for organizing their operational and command structures for themselves, under Art.44.

De-facto closer cooperation of big MS does take place, for instance between UK and France in every single case for the UNSC mandate, for armament production and external operations. But also for drafting and launching of CFSP/CSDP initiatives, for Treaty changes, for diplomatic pressure or coercion, and for initiating CSDP missions, de-facto closer cooperation of small groups of MS continues to be necessary and is possible. These will most of the time be the largest military powers of the Union, France, the UK and Germany (cf. the Iran Group), sometimes with Italy (cf. EUNAVFORMed Sophia).

But even medium European powers can find windows of opportunity if they are interested. Belgium is a case in point, with the organisation of the so-called chocolate-summit of April 2003 in Tervuren.[25]

As to practical military cooperation, as yet almost non-existent at EU-level, a large number of other bilateral and «minilateral» initiatives outside unwieldy non-consensual EU institutions have also emerged: Lancaster-House, multinational Battlegroups and Corps, between MS militaries which

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[24] EU Council (2003) SOLANA, Xavier, A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003

[25] http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2015/01/brave-little-belgium-csdp/

know and trust each other. Zandee and Pertusot see a promising pattern in these initiatives[26], which could complement the CSDP's planning, and organizing structures at EU-level.

3: The Absence of a Military Headquarters for CSDP

But even if there were more convergence among EU MS, about the EU's external security and defence policy challenges and objectives: to become of operational relevance in crisis situations, this convergence between MS must lead to realistic consensual contingency planning on which partners can quickly fall back in a crisis situation. The 'Crisis Management Planning Directorate', which assembles the principal institutions of integrated civilian-military planning within the EEAS, is a partial answer to this need, proposing planning from the 'conceptual' stage to 'operational' planning.

Nevertheless, serious *lacunae* remain. This integrated CSDP civilian-military planning process in the CMPD is more 'integrated' on the civilian than on the military side, given that it involves permanent operational headquarters with competence for the civilian side of the operations (CPCC), whereas an equivalent military headquarters lacks at EEAS level. Planning becomes lopsided. Nick Witney deplored recently "the continuing British veto, in isolation and in defiance of all logic and experience, of a proper EU Headquarters".[27] And Jo Coelmont complains about "the inability at the EU level to act preventively because of the lack of planning capabilities and … a Headquarters".[28] Zandee and Meijnders contend that UK objection about duplicating "NATO structures is no longer valid, since the point here would be specifically to strengthen the comprehensive approach, for which the EU has the comparative advantage of its own deployment of both military and civilian resources."[29] The EU's OPSCEN, 'sustained by' the EU Military Staff EU MS, and only 'activated' in case of need, is no equivalent.

The lack of a permanent staff and HQ for CSDP has frequently been invoked by French politicians and military commanders to explain the impossibility of truly relevant contingency planning for the EU, the lack of which is said to impede quick common strategic action in case of crisis and to favour unilateral operations. But much as most experts also deplore the absence of a military HQ under the same roof than the civilian one, for many connoisseurs of French military policy this is beside the point. In their opinion, French decision-makers want to preserve their freedom of decision on external operations. They prefer to solicit partners' support only after the fait accompli.

Another *lacuna* is the persisting cleavage between the two institutional 'pillars' underpinning CSDP, the Council-linked inter-governmental one, with PSC, EUMC and CIVCOM in the centre, and the Commission-linked community one with the new Service for Foreign Policy Instruments FPI in the centre. Due to their 'specific ' character, the CFSP and CSDP remain located in the TEU, under the umbrella of the general provisions of the Union's external action (Title V TEU) but are nevertheless separate from the Union's other external relations policies in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (trade, development, cooperation with third countries, humanitarian aid, relations with international organisations, etc.).[30]

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[26] Cf. the articles by PERTUSOT and ZANDEE, in FIOTT, Daniel, Ed. (2015), Common Security and Defence Policy, pp.101f. and

[27] WITNEY, Nick (2015), The United Kingdom and the CSDP, in : FIOTT, Daniel ….., pp.17-18

[28] COELMONT 2015, p.111. The same complaint can be heard in 2015, in the EEAS-CMPD's integrated strategic planning group (author's interview 2015)

[29] ZANDEE, Dick & MEIJNDERS, Minke (2015), The CSDP in Africa, p.39f.

[30] BLOCKMANS&RUSSACK (2016), ..

Both are housed in the Brussels EEAS Headquarters and the FPI sees itself working 'alongside' EEAS.[31] "Alongside", not as part of it: the community policies in Commission competence continue to function very differently from those conducted in inter-governmental structures and this has led and still leads to harmful frictions.

In Brussels, new mechanisms such as the Crisis Management Board and the Crisis Platform have improved cooperation between the various crisis management actors, but have not been able to overcome the structural barriers between EU institutions.[32]

4: The CSDP's structural incapacity of rapid executive action in military intervention

The Union can take rapid executive action in few domains that are under its exclusive competence and where one supranational institution like the Commission or the ECB holds the monopoly of decision. Even then it depends on national actors for implementation. But for all other domains, and especially those involving sovereign powers of EU MS –i.e. military or other external security-oriented CSDP missions– it is and remains in 2015 a negotiating and compromise-finding entity, incapable of rapid executive decision and action.

This weakness is compounded by national differences in decision-making, especially concerning force generation for military intervention that can render compromise-finding at EU-level longer and less certain. Certain governments have one single centre of authoritative executive decision and implementation, as France with its President. Here, military or other foreign intervention can be decided on and set up in a matter of days or even hours[33], if need be, if contingency planning is ready and needed assets are at hand.

Other governments have more complicated decision-making structures, the most relevant differences every time concerning the role of the parliament and parliamentary authorisation, and the budgeting of foreign intervention. For instance in *Germany* and *Spain* the parliaments have to give their authorisation before the out-of-area deployment of their armed forces. This procedural constraint has further spread in the EU by the UK adopting –in its turn– an analogous procedure since 2013. "As Gavin Phillipson noted in the aftermath of the Syria vote: It may now be said with some confidence that…a constitutional convention exists to the effect that the Government must, before commencing any military action, permit a debate and vote in the House of Commons and abide by its result, subject to a narrow exception" for cases of very high urgency.[34]

It would not be astonishing if this constraint had also led the EU MS to favour CSDP missions of less urgency, which are frequently also the missions of lesser military content, with lesser conflict potential, for which parliamentary acceptance is easier available.

5: The difficult coordination of Community policies with CSDP missions and the lack of EU funding for the latter

"On the one hand, the MS are still far from certain they should let the institutions step in and take the lead on foreign affairs. On the other, the commission's services still perceive traditional

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[31] http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/index_en.htm

[32] ZANDEE, Dick & MEIJNDERS, Minke (2015), The CSDP in Africa, p.39

[33] CORIOLIS, Charles Edouard de (2015), Commission Ass.Nat., July 1, 2015, p.3

[34] cf. the useful overview in CHAUVEAU& GAYMARD, 37ff.; for the citation see UK PARLIAMENT 2015, House of Commons Library Briefing Paper 7166, 'Parliamentary approval for military action', May, 12 2015 ; for PHILLIPSON 2013 cf. Gavin Phillipson, "Historic Commons Syria vote: the constitutional significance", UK Constitutional Law Group, 19 September 2013

diplomacy as contrary to the principles and spirit of the union approach." This recent statement[35] about CFSP, by Pierre VIMONT, first general secretary of the EEAS, applies also to CSDP.

A precondition for the much-vaunted comprehensive approach to External Security and Defence Policy is the ability to coordinate the external policies of the Community –from commercial policy to development and cooperation– assembled in the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) administered by the Commission, with the CSDP administered by national officials assembled in the different dedicated Council fora. These two very different types of policy have difficulties of coming together. They are subject to different principles of direction, the Commission that typically works within legally fixed longer-term programs, the Council-based institutions which –in CSDP– normally have to work in time- and topic-frames set by contingencies. How to render the first longer-term pre-defined program policies sometimes running in the same region as a CSDP mission, useful and helpful to the second often contingency-defined shorter-term operations in making Commission officials work closely and flexibly together with national officials in Council, that appears to be a challenging task not yet mastered to the satisfaction of Security Policy officials in the field, and experts.[36]

Secondly, funding of EU military operations is divided: a smaller administrative preparatory part of setting up the mission and putting it in the theatre is taken over by the EU via the 'Athena-mechanism'. The much larger part has to be assumed by each of the force contributing MS, paying for their deployed personnel and its material needs, more or less, according to the strength of their detachment: 'costs lie where they fall'. MS have not up to now been able to agree on a fully common funding. There is Treaty article 41§3 (TEU) which would allow the EU at least the funding of preparatory costs of mission not covered by Athena. But up to autumn 2015, this treaty provision had never been applied.

This heightens reticence on the side of willing contributors like Belgium, which finds itself unable to participate in missions because of its tight public finances[37]. And it increases the temptations of free riding for MS on external security policy. With common funding this would be impossible; it would likely "incentivise participation of national contingents as all MS would probably want to have a return on investment."[38]

Beside the missions of CFSP/CSDP, the already mentioned other foreign activities of the EU in the competence field of the Community are also present. Certain of these 'instruments' are frequently integrated into civilian missions of the CSDP. Especially the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace IcSP has taken on an increasing role.

 Since 2014 the EEAS tried to have an initiative 'Train and Equip' for military capacity building in states financed out of these funds, to make effective military training of African forces possible. But only in 2015, with the communication of HRVP and the Commission on this issue in the month of May, began a serious initiative to overcome the resistance of development departments and officials, against funds destined for development, being re-directed to military activities. It is expected to give results in the future[39].

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[35] VIMONT, Pierre (2015), The Path to an Upgraded EU Foreign Policy, in : Carnegie Europe, Policy Outlook, June 2015, p.4
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Vimont_EU_Foreign_Policy_Posting.pdf

[36] CHAUVEAU/GAYMARD (2015), p.70-71

[37] http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2015/01/brave-little-belgium-csdp/

[38] http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2015/01/brave-little-belgium-csdp/

[39] TARDY,Thierry(2015), Commission Ass.Nat., July 1, 2015, p.8

6: The Fragmentation of the EU's Military Instrument

Other often-cited weaknesses of the CSDP would appear to play a more secondary role for the Europeanisation of the EU MS' defence policies. Of these, the fragmentation of military assets among the EU MS is perhaps the most important one. The potentials which more specialization on tasks, more grouped procurement on a more competitive armaments market and more sharing and pooling[40] of military assets promise to set free among the 28 EU MS, are enormous. First, big gains in defence power per Euro spent by public budgets –more bang for the buck– could be made. Secondly, EU MS' political-economic-technological cooperation and their armed forces' effectiveness would improve.

All of this is well known. It has been discussed widely since EU MS started to cash in on the peace dividend after the end of the Cold War. The debate re-kindled since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008 when a new wave of defence-budget-slashes started in the EU.[41]

Experts largely agree that eleven years later almost nothing has been achieved of these objectives. MS have preferred to shrink their budgets autonomously, either holding on to full sets of military forces, like the largest military powers, smaller MS cutting certain capacities and shrinking in uncoordinated manner. Where national suppliers survive, national militaries will procure from them, as far as possible. Organized pooling and sharing of military assets between EU MS, sensible as it appeared, remains a rare exception. [42]

This failure shows most clearly where measures have actually been taken, for instance concerning the European Defence Agency EDA, and the so-called Battlegroups, i.e. multinational battalion-sized military units of which two have to be ready for deployment in crisis situations within 15 days at all times.

Battlegroups: In fact, 18 of these Battlegroups have been created and rotate actively for standby since 2007.[43] "The decision to use the EU-BG can only be taken by full EU consensus"[44]. Although "the deployment of Battlegroups was contemplated on a number of occasions to respond to a deteriorating crisis situation – for example in DR Congo (2006 and 2008), South Sudan (2010), in support of a possible UN humanitarian operation in Libya (2011) and in Mali (2012)–"[45] the Council has never used them in a CSDP mission. The national funding obligation, perhaps also the existence of NATO and UN peacekeeping/-making missions for the same kind of contingencies in which EU MS also participate, have probably contributed to that reticence. An even stronger disincentive might well be the limited military size and task and the strong civilian penchant of CSDP missions, together with the remaining weaknesses of that policy as discussed further up. That has much devalued the battlegroup concept. By the way, the European Air Transport Command (EATC) appears to suffer up

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[40] Code of Conduct of Pooling and Sharing 2012, pledges to systematically consider cooperation in national defence capability planning. http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/news/code-of-conduct.pdf

[41] The main elements of this debate and the relevant calculations are nicely summed up, other relevant sources referenced in the already cited EPSC (2015) Strategic Note 'In Defence of Europe'

[42] Cf. the analyses assembled in STAACK, Michael und Dan KRAUSE, Hg. (2014), Europa als sicherheitspolitischer Akteur, and MÖLLING, Christian (2013), Wege aus der europäischen Verteidigungskrise. Bausteine für eine Verteidigungssektorreform. SWP-Studie 8, Berlin

[43] "The EU Battlegroups and the EU civilian and military cell" (PDF). European Union Factsheet. European Council. February 2005. Retrieved 10 July 2015.

[44] ONYSZKIEWICZ, Janusz (2015), 'Finding a use for the European Union Battle Groups', Europe's World, Web exclusive, October 28 2015,

[45] BARCIKOWSKA, Anna (2015), 'EU Battlegroups – Ready to go ?', EUISS Brief, 40-2013, p.4

to the end of 2015 from an analogous reticence of CSDP mission participants, which prefer to organise their mutual air transport support themselves instead of entrusting it to EATC.[46]

European Defence Agency (EDA): In 2004, after the experiences of the first CSDP missions and in the face of defence budget reductions, even sceptical experts saw a chance for the new EDA to reach tangible results –after a rather 'virtual' initial phase– in a number of important structuring tasks: [47] pressure EU member-states to spend more on new military equipment; prod EU defence ministries to think more strategically about their long-term defence needs, and harmonise their requirements, as to personnel and the quantity and quality of armaments; adapt and coordinate defence research and development (R&D) accordingly, among themselves; build a more open and competitive European market for defence goods; encourage the convergence of national procurement procedures.

In 2016 EDA remains a small institution of ca. 130 personnel, headed by the HRVP and led by a Spanish career diplomat, and tasked by the Steering Board, identical with the Defence Ministers' Council. It is a kind of multinational service provider, with projects –certainly important, but clearly limited in scope and subject matter– of a technical character "across the defence spectrum to help deliver the results and capabilities our MS need." The European Council of December 2013 endorsed four major capability programs prepared by EDA: Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR), Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), Governmental Satellite Communication and Cyber Defence.

At the other end of the spectrum one finds support to CSDP military missions with a bundle of services, like contracts for satellite communication, training in cyber defence, or providing HR management software to operational commands.[48] No question any more of having a kind of pro-active guidance mission, "pressuring" or "prodding" the MS in whatever direction, or thinking more strategically about their long-term defence needs. But on the other hand, if the ambition of the five projects just enumerated appears limited, they reflect pretty accurately the true needs of a CSDP with limited ambitions itself, increasingly concentrated on expeditionary interventions in Africa.

The Three Security and Defence Policies of the EU MS

CFSP/CSDP is one of the three formats in which EU MS' External Security Policy cooperation takes place as they were outlined at the beginning of this chapter: that of the MS alone or in small coalitions, that of the European Union (CFSP/CSDP), or in NATO. Drawing this point out somewhat further, one could speak of the EU MS as having a different security and defence policy at each of these levels, one at the North Atlantic Treaty, a second at the European CSDP level, for certain of them a third unilaterally, each obeying a different logic and different rules but also with wide overlap.

At each of these levels, and according to the kind and the gravity of the challenge they confront, they will retain different degrees of national autonomy, or accept different degrees of mandatory/obliga-tory cooperation between themselves, or with external partners. The result is European MS' groups of different size and composition, with different external allies, and of different 'density/coherence' of purpose and weight of instruments, which confront the external adversaries.

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[46] FROMION/ROUILLARD (2014), p.218. Cf. also http://eatc-mil.com/45/News/News+&+Press+updates for a list of EATC's missions in the years since 2013, which confirms that reticence.

[47] Typical the policy brief of KEOHANE, Daniel (2004), Europe's New Defence Agency, Centre for European Reform, London Daniel KEOHANE, "Europe's New Defence Agency," Policy Brief (London: Centre for European Reform, 2004). to which this paragraph refers.

[48] http://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/eda-priorities/capability-programmes, and http://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2016/01/19/european-defence-agency-supports-csdp-operations (accessed 2016/02/02)

The Narrow Scope of CSDP

After having established the range of challenges and the European frame of the different institutions, rules and options within which EU MS make their choices of regional security and defence cooperation, the report now turns more systematically to CFSP/CSDP performance. It attempts to assess its scope of action, its structures, strengths and weaknesses. But the report also seeks to assess its relative rank among **all** the coordination options at EU MS' disposal, as it emerges out of their choices. That cannot be done without taking also the global security-policy context into account, with its principal actor being the United Nations. It will be introduced under 'External Enablers'.

So which coordination options do EU MS choose for security and defence, in the second decade of the 21st century?

France and the UK are the only MS which will choose the unilateral or ad-hoc coalitions mode for military intervention cases they think they can handle and where national interests appear directly involved. Only for crisis-management missions (enumerated in TEU Art.43§1, Lisbon Treaty) of lesser conflict intensity in the European and Neighbourhood region and beyond is there a clear preference of the other twenty-six Member States plus France and the UK for using CSDP missions instead of NATO[49,50].

All the 28 participate in security/defence-related decision-making in the EU CFSP/CSDP decision-making bodies; almost all of them –very explicitly also including for instance 'peripheral' members like the Scandinavian MS, or Ireland– do now and then take part in the CSDP missions with military and other personnel.

Even so, among these 28 Germany and for the Mediterranean also Italy, together with the UK and France, continue to play a special role in the conceptual planning of CSDP structures and military missions, and for these latter in 'kicking off' the force contribution process. Poland is structurally predestined to play an analogous role, were it not for its fixation on the Russian threat and the CSDP's disinterest vis-à-vis that front.[51]

The preference of the 28 for dealing with that limited vector of security challenges in CSDP, is encouraged by the first paragraph of article 42 TEU, stating that the Union uses the 'operational capacities' of the CSDP "on missions *outside the Union* for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter." *Self-Defence is explicitly not included* in the tasks that may be carried out (cf. also Article 43§1TEU).

But even there, EU MS also use the NATO format for ambitious military missions: in 2016 NATO's Afghanistan mission 'Resolute Support', its anti-terrorist mission 'Active Endeavour' in the Mediterranean, its Assistance to the African Union's crisis management missions, and its Counter-Piracy operations off Somalia. NATO's 7-month involvement in Libya in 2011, called 'Unified Protector', also resulted from the explicit choice of this format by France and the UK.

Crisis management also includes, according to TEU art.43§1 "tasks of combat forces ….., including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization". But as a result of MS' political choices more than of Treaty obligations, CSDP missions, military or civilian, have come to limit themselves to monitor,

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[49] http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm, accessed 08 07 2015. Of 32 missions since 2003 only 9 went to European countries, most of them in former Yugoslavia, plus 2 in Georgia and 1 in Ukraine. The others went to Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, two going to Afghanistan and Indonesia.

[50] http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/berlin/index_en.htm, accessed 08 07 2015. The two CSDP missions under the Berlin-Plus agreement (Concordia and Althea in former Yugoslavia, replacing preceding NATO missions) both foresaw robust military action if needed.

[51] http://jacekbartosiak.pl/en/csdp-is-a-remote-concept-in-poland/

manage and bring to an end, a conflictual situation, and try to consolidate the peace, but without fighting. "The EU has so far adhered to the crisis management principles of consent, limited coercion and relative impartiality for its own CSDP operations".[52] This specific character of missions evidently permits to restrict the type of the deployed military tool and very largely renounce to the heavy arms of higher-intensity warfare.

A schematic list of internal enabler frameworks and the resulting types of EU MS' security policy cooperation looks like this:

- CFSP: action including crisis diplomacy by large EU powers, or using EC competencies like sanctions;
- CSDP: crisis-management including civilian and military missions, UN-mandated or invited;
- EU: action as bi- or multilateral 'solidarity' action vis-à-vis a Member State in a security emergency (TEU 42§7, or TFEU 222§2);
- EU: action as international partner i.e. in the Iran nuclear negotiations,
- EU MS Collective: action in NATO;
- EU MS Autonomous: action;
    - Very frequently with the USA as partner. See France in (West-) Africa, in Libya, in its second 2015 initiative vis-à-vis Syria;
    - As members of UN missions;
    - As leaders vis-à-vis Russia as in Minsk agreements; here, Germany typically in diplomatic missions (Iran+Minsk f ex), France and UK typically in military missions (Libya, Iraq).

"Comprehensive" security policy also pre-supposes the activation of many more levers than the sole military one, to impose the EU's will upon an adversary and to render the results more sustainable. Their number has multiplied especially with the advances of globalization.

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[52] TARDY (2015) Operation Sophia, p.3

If one combines these institutional aspects, together with aspects concerning the objects and intensity of conflicts, and their geographic location, the following table gives a useful synthesis.

	Europe+close East-European neighborhood	Southern + Eastern Mediterranean	Africa
Crisis diplomacy + coalition building	big MS coalition (plus US?) Russia, Ukraine, Crimea	big EU MS (coalition) plus USA (and EU) Iran nuclear,	big EU MS (coalition) plus UN, US (and EU)
Security vector:	external	external	external
non-military coercion	CFSP, together with US Sanctions vs Russia	CFSP, together with US Sanctions vs Iran	
Security vector:	external	external	external
Civilian SSR, capacity building, information exchange, other	CSFP/CSDP (plus NATO) Kosovo,	CFSP civilian	CSDP civilian
Security vector:	external	internal + external	internal + external
Low intensity non-armed conflict	CSDP (and/or NATO ?)	CSDP EUNAVFOR Med vs smugglers	CSDP (+NATO) ATALANTA vs pirates
Security vector:	internal + external	internal + external	internal + external
Higher intensity armed conflict small challenge	NATO and/or CSDP	EU MS+ coalitions plus US	EU MS+CSDP+ coal. plus US Mali (F+CSDP), Barkhane (F+US)
Security vector:	external	internal + external	internal + external
High intensity armed conflict big challenge	NATO(+EU)-MS in dissuasive posture vis-à-vis Russia	NATO	
Security vector:	external	external	

On the following page: EU CSDP missions 2003 to 2015

Organised chronologically and according to the geographic location of the target country, with number of deployed personnel. 'MIL' designates military missions, 'CIV' civilian ones. 'CIV (+MIL)' is an officially designated civilian one with significant military content, as for the two EUCAP Sahel which have a military training component.

Sources: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/ 'ongoing' and 'completed' missions, plus the associated factsheets. Organised in chart by Christian DEUBNER

Years	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2015	active Personnel	Totals Europe and Africa
East Asia			Aceh CIV-AMM													
Central Asia					Afghanistan CIV – EuPol 156										156	
Africa Centr						Guinea-Biss CIV – EUSSR 8			SouthSudan CIV – EuAvSec 34							2240
Africa East								Somalia MIL – EuTM 155							155	
Africa East										Djibouti, Somalia, Tanzania, Seychelles CIV – EuCap Nestor 86					86	
Africa East						Somalia MIL – EuNavFor Atalanta Mil 1200									1200	
Africa West										Niger CIV (+MIL) – EuCap Sahel 56					56	
Africa West												Mali CIV (+MIL) – EuCap Sahel 80			80	
Africa West											Mali MIL – EuTM 578				578 (?)	
Africa Centr			DR Congo, CIV – EuSec 10												10	
Africa Centr	Congo MIL-Artemis ca			Congo MIL-EuFor	DR Congo CIV – EuPol 31											
Africa Centr			DR Congo CIV – Kinshasa Pol 29 (12F)			Chad/CAR MIL – EuFor 3700						CAR MIL – EuFor 1000	CAR MIL – EuMam ca60		60	
Africa North											Libya EuBam 17				17	
Arab Penins			PalestTerr CIV – EuBam Rafah 4												4	
Arab Penins				PalestTerr CIV – EuPol COPPS 71											71	
Arab Penins			Iraq CIV – Lex EuJust 53													
Europe			Bosnia-Herceg. MIL – Althea EuFor Mil 600												600 incl Partner	Ca. 3400
Europe		Georgia CIV – Themis EuJust n.a.				Georgia CIV – EuMM 200									200+	
Europe	Bosnia-Herceg. CIV – EuPM 478											Ukraine CIV – EuAM ca 20			20	
Europe	MIL – Con-cordia	Fyrom CIV – Proxima EuPol Ca 200		CIV- EuPat Ca 30		Kosovo CIV – EuLex ca.800									800+	
Europe														EuNavFor Med Sophia	1800	
Years	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2015	active Personnel	Totals Europe and Africa

Personnel numbers are international (mostly EU). In 2015
the largest staff numbers are active in European CSDP missions, with around 3400 personnel
, second is Africa with around 2240.
In Central Asia ca. 156 personnel remain in a mission in Afghanistan.
In the Arabian peninsula around 75 personnel serve.
The largest military deployments of CSDP by far go to Europe and Africa as well: ca. 2400 in Europe and 2000 in Africa. This picture changes if we count the Operation Sophia, in the Mediterranean, as deployed half-way between Europe and Africa. Giving each of the two continents half, lets the scale descend in Africa's favor, to 2900, whereas only 1500 CSDP-servicemen and –women are deployed in Europe. The same effect is reached with the totals.

Geographical Orientation towards Africa, and –potentially– the Arabian Peninsula.

The limits of CSDP (being only one of the EU MS' cooperative external security policy frameworks, beside NATO and others, and limited up to now to crisis-management with low-intensity conflict risks), together with the special and strong regional relationship of the EU's most active military power, France, and the evolution of external security challenges have led to a very specific geographic orientation of CSDP, the principal poles being Europe and Africa, with the latter preponderant and becoming so even more.

This is not astonishing: Africa continues to be the most unstable continent, although this fact is over-shadowed by the burgeoning crisis in the Middle East. The struggle for political legitimacy, control of the state and access to economic power are the main causes of armed conflict. Dick Zandee and Minke Meijnders concur in a very recent text: "Africa will remain the EU's most likely area of operations in the future. Numerous factors play a role in this, including its geographical proximity and the risk of spill-over effects in Europe (in the shape of terrorism, organized crime and migration), concerns about the humanitarian situation, and historical ties arising from former colonial relationships."[53]

Looking at nothing but the numbers of CSDP's expansion to Africa, and comparing them with those of France, one cannot but note the 'suivisme' of the Europeans: where the French had been already before with numerous missions, the EU moved in together with them since 2003, most of the time helping out in the established zone of French influence.

External Enablers

The first important point to understand about external enablers is that the EU MS' two regional security/defence cooperation formats CFSP/CSDP and NATO do not function in an unstructured global security-policy context. Rather, there is a third, global, level of their cooperation, the United Nations, which does in its turn also put the sole CFSP/CSDP into perspective. It does not only do so in setting the rules and the operational stage, but also in influencing the power structures within the CSFP/CSDP decision-making bodies.

United Nations setting the rules

"Rule-based": The EU MS from the UK to Germany, declare external security policy, including CFSP/CSDP to be strongly 'rule-based', the EU sees itself strongly committed … "to support and work for effective multilateralism, with the United Nations at its core" [54]. Again at the global level these rules are set by the United Nations' legislation in which EUMS try to implant their preferences. It provides the basic rules concerning the right of a state or a coalition of states to undertake coercive action, or take up arms against an enemy state. But in addition the United Nations have two key operative functions in international security policy to play.

First, the mandate of the Security Council provides the legal authorisation and defines the moment within a process of evolving tension and conflict, at which a state, in our case one or more EU MS, may legitimately use instruments of military coercion (under chapter VII) vis-à-vis another state.[55]

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[53] ZANDEE, Dick & MEIJNDERS, Minke (2015), The CSDP in Africa, in: ZANDEE Ed.(2015),The EU as a security actor in Africa. In-depth study Clingendael Monitor 2016, Clingendael, p.31

[54] See also EU Council (2003) SOLANA, Xavier, A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December, p.9. Cf. more recently HRVP Catherine ASHTON's statement to the UNSC on 14.02.2014,
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2014/170214_ca_un_en.htm

[55] {HEINTZE, 1998 #205}; There were only two exceptions to this rule made by EU MS acting in concerted external security policy, the NATO mission in Kosovo and the US-led coalition against Iraq in the second Gulf War in 2003 (with 4 EU MS UK, Spain, Italy and Denmark) which both lacked a UNSC mandate.

(One exception to this rule: all states may exercise self-defence, including EU collective self-defence, against military aggression, until the UNSC takes action). Secondly, the United Nations Security Council mandates and the United Nations organises, with the votes and support of its European members, its own peace-keeping or enforcing missions in Europe, Middle East and Africa, within which serve military and civil personnel from EU MS, alongside a much larger number of African, and other non-EU personnel.[56]

Thirdly in this powerful institution which defines the frame within which CSDP may act, only two EU MS, the UK and France, have permanent seats and veto-power, a powerful lever of projecting EU (or their own) interests into this forum. By that structural fact alone, the United Nations also has a strong influence on the internal power distribution among CSDP MS, giving the two states a privileged position in CSDP decision-making. Both these European votes are needed to open the way to a UNSC resolution in case that the EU aims for a military mission outside its own borders. And just one suffices to torpedo any proposal whatsoever from being backed by the UNSC, showing the enormous importance of searching EU consensus, and the outsized influence of both France and the UK in this effort.

Both functions are part of the leading role of the Security Council in issues related to the maintenance of international peace and security, a role in which the Council increasingly expects support and cooperation from regional and sub-regional organizations, like for instance from the European Union.

The ongoing CSDP operations Althea in Bosnia and Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden as well as in the past EUFOR RCA, the two operations in the DRC (2003 and 2006) and the one in Chad (2008-09) were created on the basis of a Chapter VII UNSC resolution. In all these cases however, including the two EUTMs in Somalia and Mali and EUMAM RCA, the host government has also consented to the EU deployment."[57]

UN also setting the operational stage

In the very regions i.e. the Mediterranean, Africa and the Middle East, in which the EU conducts its comparatively small CSDP operations, the United Nations has also frequently defined the context on the ground by its peace operations presence: to the east and south of Europe, current United Nations peace operations put almost 30 times the number of soldiers, twelve times the police and five times the civilian international personnel into crisis spots than does the European Union. And they concentrate in Africa (with ca. 80% of UN peacekeepers).

Comparative peace operations deployment east and south of Europe in 2014-15: [58]

	milit	police	civil	Total
UN	85.854	12.028	5.202	103.084

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[56] Assemblée Nationale (2015), 14 Législature, Commission des Affaires Etrangères, CHAUVEAU, Guy-Michel & GAYMARD, Hervé, Rapport d'information sur "engagement et diplomatie: Quelle doctrine pour nos interventions militaires?", May 20, 2015, p.58; cf. for this and the following also TARDY, Thierry (2013), Partnering in crisis management: Ten years of UN-EU cooperation, EUISS brief 30/2013

[57] TARDY, Thierry (2015), Operation Sophia; Tackling the refugee crisis with military means, in: ISSUE Brief 30(September)2015, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_30_Operation_Sophia.pdf, p.3, accessed 10.10.2015

[58] Cf. the very useful compilations of the German Centre for International Peace Operations: http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/International_Personnel_in_Peace_Operations_2014_ENG.pdf, accessed 19 07 2015

EU	3.205	993	906	5.104
NATO '15	14.882	0	0	14.882
Total	100.394	13.021	6.108	

The dimensions of these United Nations missions are also more demanding than those of the EU. But for the rest their approach is very similar: post-conflict, peace-keeping and –building, with a comprehensive approach like the EU, as the comparative personnel structure of missions already suggests.

Where they exist, they set a de-facto frame which constrains EU CFSP policymakers on the ground, once they decide to start a mission vis-à-vis an outside state. And then, the division of labour on the ground leaves the bigger tasks to the United Nations, on the continent most contiguous to the EU on which most EU peacekeepers (ca. 56%) are engaged as well.[59]

A good example is Mali, in spring 2015. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), fields 9140 military personnel, plus 1250 police. The EU has a police capacity building mission EUCAP, with 18 police, and a military Training Mission EUTM, with 580 military personnel. Military and police personnel from certain EU MS are present in the UN force as well as in the EU one.[60]

Finally, the United Nations is also an explicit operational *demandeur*. As Ban Ki-Moon told the EU HRVP in March 2015 that the United Nations has explicit operational expectations vis-à-vis the EU:

- To remain an effective actor in its major missions, and therefore;
- To overcome internal frictions and difficulties;
- To increase the rapidity and effectiveness of its political engagement and of early action before a situation visibly deteriorates;
- To serve as a bridging actor to United Nations missions which take (even) longer to set up.[61]

Zones of Influence

If you have only one of the three principal CSDP actors permanently interested, solicited and activist in the emerging main theatre of CSDP missions, this will inevitably have a significant structuring effect. It will influence the internal structures of decision-making, and the geographical orientation of CSDP.

That is the case for France's important role in setting the stage for CSDP in Africa. Of the 8 African countries where the CSDP deployed since 2003, 6 have privileged relations with France, 5 of them being former colonies, the francophone DR Congo having close military and economic relations with France since the presidency of Mobutu in the 1970ies.[62] Only Libya and Guinea Bissao –among CSDP target countries – had been outside the French zone of immediate influence.

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[59] http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/International_Personnel_in_Peace_Operations_2014_DE.pdf, accessed 08 07 2015

[60] Ibid., cf. also for Minusma http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/facts.shtml, accessed on 31.07.2015; cf. also Land der trügerischen Hoffnung, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung no 173, 29.07.2015, p.2

[61] Ban Ki-Moon, 2015 03 09, S/PV.7402, 7402nd Meeting of the UN Security Council, Agenda: Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security, European Union, p.2

[62] For this cf. IKIZER, Ihsan (2011) Democratic Republic of the Congo and Libya: What are the similarities for France?, March 28, 2011, in : http://www.alarabiya.net/views/2011/03/28/143276.html, accessed on 10.12.2015

France's outspoken principal interest in CSDP remains the support it can get for the maintenance of *African security*, especially in the regions formerly under its colonial control, for reasons of legitimacy and of financial support (cf. CHAUVEAU&GAYMARD, p.61f. and FROMION&ROUILLARD, p.253). That is confirmed by the political testimonies of experts and politicians and the data on French 'external operations'.

French decision-makers only turn to CSDP if and insofar it can actually be useful for this purpose. To succeed in this approach, the French government must convince its EU partners of the 'European' relevance of specific African security risks. French efforts in that direction have become more systematic and more compelling over the years: If there was just the one first African CSDP mission 'Artemis' in 2003, initiated by France, France participated in 7 of the 9 African CSDP missions in 2015, according to the provisional data of CHAUVEAU/ GAYMARD and the EEAS.[63] As Thierry Tardy said in a recent statement: "France is the most ambitious country: with the exception of the Althea mission, none of the other mission would have been launched without France", i.e. French initiatives.[64]

On the other hand, the most ambitious and demanding French African military operations have remained outside CSDP with France only accepting supplementary support from other states and GOs, the two last of them being the French intervention in Mali of 2013, SERVAL, and the successor mission BARKHANE in the Sahel zone ongoing since 2014. And France has begun systematically to reduce its participation in, or pull out of, CSDP missions in which it could not exercise significant influence.[65]

NATO[66]

In looking at the benchmark for evaluating external Security and Defence Policy coordination in the EU, it has already been remarked that the existence of the NATO defence alliance permits the EC since its creation in 1957, and later the EU, to neglect its MS' territorial security and defence concerns to a large degree. This has not changed until today (2016). For the possibility of armed attack against its territory, and for the real cases of most other cooperative military fighting missions in- and outside Europe, the NATO alliance remained and stays the operative frame of choice for most of the EU's MS. By the tasks it assumes, and EU MS within it, NATO also circumscribes and qualifies the place left to CSDP. How has this important role evolved in the last two decades?

In the 1990s after the end of the Cold War, the falling-apart of the Soviet Union and the dramatic weakening of Russia, NATO itself lost its *raison d'être* for a decade, with the EU MS cashing in on the dividends of peace by drastic reductions of their defence budgets. Then, the advocates of nascent CSDP saw a widening field of action facing them and felt growing support and resources behind.[67] US officials came to regard NATO mostly as a toolbox for building coalitions of the willing for expeditionary warfare or humanitarian missions.[68]

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[63] Cf. the EEAS register and CHAUVEAU/ GAYMARD, especially pp.96f. and 113ff. **

[64] TARDY, Thierry (2015), in: Assemblée Nationale, etc., p.8

[65] CHAUVEAU/ GAYMARD, especially p.12

[66] The challenge against which NATO's collective self-defence system was created never materialized during the Cold War. And even after 1990, that kind of cases never occurred in NATO territory until 9/11 in 2001. The Alliance –including its European members– has been looking to widen its tasks since the late 1980ies, including to missions of a type which the CSDP has aspired to in its turn.

[67] Cf. DANJEAN and GNESOTTO (2015) in Commission Ass.Nat., July 1, 2015, both p.4 and Gnesotto also p.6

[68] NATO's weight in EU MS' external military defence considerations started to increase further in 2009 when after 43 years of absence France rejoined the alliance's integrated command in Brussels, thus re-confirming NATO's success in conserving a key role in European defence even twenty years after the end of the Cold War. Cf. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/11/AR2009031100547.html, accessed 08.07.2015

But since the renaissance of Russian military power and assertiveness under president Putin, and especially since the Russian aggressions against Georgia and the Ukraine, the EU MS' territorial security and defence as a priority concern is back.[69] In addition, there is the new field of NATO crisis-management operations which evolved after 1990 and extended to regions and tasks which have also increasingly become the fields of EU CFSP/CSDP missions.

How will these developments impact the evolving EU CFSP/CSDP? Will they not detract needed assets and political support from CSDP and the Southern flank? [70]

The Newest Developments of Challenges and Enablers

Challenges

The evolving role of the US

The US constitutes a crucially important conditioning, and potentially supporting, factor of EU MS' security and defence policy, not only in NATO. This is true if its European engagement were to shrink, or to increase. It also plays an increasing role in Africa, the principal area of CSDP missions.[71] In 2014-15, France initiated most of its unilateral African missions with the support or in contact with, the United States, at the operational level with its Africa Command 'Africom'[72].

One example is France's Operation Barkhane, an ambitious counter-terrorism initiative launched 2014 and spread across five countries in Africa's Sahel and Sahara regions. The mission came at a time when the US was expanding its own counter-terrorism operations on the continent, setting the stage for what some analysts consider a burgeoning Franco-American alliance in Africa."[73] Experts see the US military making a 'pivot to Africa' with rapidly growing military operations under the Obama administration.[74] To a lesser extent, the UK and Canada are also active in a number of countries in the Sahel-Sahara, including Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania, as well as Libya and Nigeria, "often in combat operations and on a permanent basis."

Other international actors also play a growing role, especially China, but also India and Brazil. In consequence, at the strategic level "Europe's influence in Africa will tend to decrease. For Europe, this implies a process of adaptation that will not run equally smoothly everywhere. Even more than is the case today, African states and regimes will start to position themselves actively in this field".[75] This growing African orientation of external powers and especially the US could theoretically reduce

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[69] DNA 2014 Ukraine crisis sends NATO 'back to basics': To protect MS against perceived Russian threat Thursday, 14 August 2014 - 7:45pm IST | Place: Paris | Agency: Reuters , Cf. http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report-ukraine-crisis-sends-nato-back-to-basics-to-protect-member-states-against-perceived-russian-threat-2010773

[70] Cf. for instance DANJEAN (2015) p.5: "the Ukrainian crisis completely wrecks the idea of European Defence"

[71] An interesting precursor bringing French and other EU MS' law enforcement authorities and military support together with the US DEA and civil-military actors from West African countries, to suppress illicit drug trafficking by sea and air, was the above-mentioned 'Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre – Narcotics' (MAOC (N))71. It exists since 2007.Cf. http://www.maoc.eu/who.php#168, last accessed 08.10.2015

[72] CHAUVEAU/GAYMARD, p.47, go so far as to say that the US today are the 'partenaire majeur', the most important (single?) partner of France in its military operations. Cf. also in the same vein FROMION, Yves & ROUILLARD, Gwendal (2014), Rapport d'information sur l'évolution du dispositif militaire français en Afrique et sur le suivi des opérations en cours, Paris: Assemblée Nationale 14. Législature, Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, 09. 07. 2014, p.280

[73] https://news.vice.com/article/the-us-and-france-are-teaming-up-to-fight-a-sprawling-war-on-terror-in-africa (accessed 22.09.2015) "This is a new chapter in French-American relations," Michael Shurkin, a former CIA analyst who is now a security policy consultant at the RAND Corporation, told VICE News. "There is an unprecedented level of cooperation going on."; cf. also http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/06/20-us-french-collaboration-africa-security-sy. Cf. also REEVE, Richard, lead author of a report in Remote Control, a project under the auspices of the UK-based Oxford Research Group, "From New Frontier to New Normal: Counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel-Sahara ".

[74] TURSE, Nick (2015), America's Empire of African Bases AFRICOM's new math, the U.S. base bonanza, and "scarier" times ahead in Africa, in : Common Dreams, November 18, 2015 by TomDispatch, http://www.commondreams.org/views/2015/11/18/americasempireafricanbases

[75] HOEBEKE, Hans (2015) Africa as a continent of conflict, in :ZANDEE Ed.(2015),The EU as a security actor in Africa, p.19

French needs for CSDP or Germany in Africa. At the same time though, it could very well also confront France with new and more powerful political and economic competitors in Africa, where previously the other Europeans tended to leave France in the lead on these accounts. Then, a strengthened EU African presence could still be helpful for French interests. In fact, there is no evidence for the expectation that these new actors could initiate a period of stabilisation and growth among the major part of African states in the near or medium future.

The Irruption of Internal Security Objectives into CSDP

It was already emphasised that security challenges in Africa and the Arabian peninsula will increase[76], given the continent's enormous and increasing economic, demographic and political difficulties, the absence of sufficient economic growth and employment and of sustained reform efforts, and the growing militancy and violence of the many challengers of the established regimes. Add to this the expected regional water conflicts and the effects of the climate crisis. More spill-over effects will be felt inside the EU, via irregular migration, illicit trafficking of all sorts, and probably terrorist attacks. All this will lead to more initiatives for crisis management operations in Africa. And in these initiatives an important facet comes increasingly to the fore, a facet on which this report has already tried to shed additional light, i.e. the policy of internal security (such as counter-terrorism or migration control) and the link between the two security policies. This link or interface has already dramatically broadened and intensified in the last two decades.

The biggest military CSDP missions are meanwhile conducted not with a military (or hybrid) adversary, but with extra-European criminal gangs in mind, as Somalian pirates (Atalanta) or Libyan people smugglers (Sophia), whom the EU MS wants to apprehend, the business model of whom they want to destroy, by the action of their navies. Many other missions are initiated with the argument that they ostensibly protect the EU MS' internal security, by tackling –for instance– the root causes of terrorism or of migration in Africa's Mediterranean coastal states, Sahel Zone or further South.

In part this is done to better 'sell' these missions to participating EU MS' decision-makers or reticent publics.[77] But in fact, in 2014/15 (as our table further up shows) the majority of the ongoing missions have already exactly that as their principal, or a secondary objective. Germany strongly supports these types of CSDP-missions.[78] And they are likely to increase in number.

Frequently, experts criticise, these missions also "seek the fastest possible exit", not investing the effort and time to do away with the root causes of the *maladies africaines*. For longer-term military securitisation of crisis areas, the EU has developed –like the United Nations and other non-African states– with the African Union a division of labor where African states contribute longer-term "'boots on the ground', for instance in UN-Missions, while the EU supplies mainly temporary and supplementary special capabilities". But many doubts remain whether these intra-African interventions can in their turn succeed in curing the root causes. European onlookers see the ball rather in the EU's camp for better planned, more comprehensive, longer-term CSDP peace building policies in Africa in the future.[79]

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[76] Every now and then one reads an optimistic piece on African perspectives which appears to contradict the pessimistic predictions which follow, cf. the speech of the German minister for development cooperation, Müller: http://www.bmz.de/de/presse/reden/minister_mueller/2016/maerz/20160315_Africa_meets_business_Arbeitskreis_Afrika_der_CDU_CSU__Bundestagsfraktion.html

[77] Interview with a high official of the EEAS' CMPD in June 2015; cf. also very explicitly GNESOTTO (2015) p.14

[78] Cf. KEMPIN, Ronja(2015), From reluctance to policy, who underlines the increasing proportion of this kind of missions. Among the 17 CSDP missions of end 2015, 10 have border management, internal security sector reform, police training, coast-guard management etc. as their principal objective.

[79] ZANDEE, Dick & MEIJNDERS, Minke (2015), The CSDP in Africa, p.37. Cf. also FROMION&ROUILLARD 2014, p.247f.

A potential perspective of higher intensity missions for the CSDP?

If these intervention patterns remain in keeping with an orientation developed over the last decade, certain experts see new challenges emerging in the future which would involve the EU, in Africa, in operations at the higher end of the violence spectrum.

That may come about more frequently if and when the United Nations –in following up its intention of putting regional organizations more often into its service (cf. further up) – were to demand "the EU to intervene in situations of serious human rights violations, war crimes or humanitarian emergencies. Such operations are referred to as 'initial entry' or 'bridging' operations, for example until the moment a UN force –normally manned by African militaries as well– is ready to intervene. In those cases the increasing use of heavier weapons, roadside bombs and other means of violence will place higher demands on EU military operations."[80]

These would be operations of the 'French type', but which would need to open out into longer-term peace-building projects set up within a serious comprehensive approach.

For this report, a key aspect of the most recent challenges and their predictable development is that they concern –simultaneously– both the Eastern and Northeastern and the Southern and Southeastern flank of the EU. The first one is watched over by the EU's NATO MS cooperating with their transatlantic partners within the frame of NATO, within which they have since 2014 implemented a stronger Eastern deployment and the first increase in defence spending since 2008. The second one is watched over by the EUMS cooperating in the CFSP/CSDP format, and by France and the UK, unilaterally or in small coalitions. Here as well, military preparations have somewhat increased, especially by virtue of the 'Sophia' mission.

Internal Enablers

Strengthening institutional coordination at Commission level

Even so, it seems that within the Commission and the EEAS some further tangible improvements of CFSP/CSDP decision-making have been introduced. It was already said that on the Council and EEAS side an important and functional institutional frame had been created after the European Council of Nice, reinforced by the Lisbon Treaty, and successfully set to work during the past decade. To flesh out the objectives of the comprehensive approach to CSDP, changes were due especially on the Commission's side.

During the Barroso Commission, a silo approach to policy-making prevailed, also among the Commissioners responsible for the different external Community policies. One of the signal achievements of the Juncker Commission is to have ended this practice by clustering the Commissioners with related portfolios under Vice-presidents and obliging these groups to submit grouped initiatives to the college of Commissioners. European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, International Cooperation and Development, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management, and Trade, are clustered under HRVP Mogherini, arguably the best option to enhance collegial decision-making. The HRVP has intensified her coordination effort inside the Commission by what she calls "Operationalizing the comprehensive approach". The principal innovation is a re-activation in 2014, of the Commissioners' Group on External Action (CGEA) which Steven Blockmans has considered "one of the most important institutional initiatives in EU foreign policy-making." In its first year of activity, that Group has enormously facilitated "inter-service cooperation both within the Commission and

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[80] ZANDEE, Dick & MEIJNDERS, Minke (2015), The CSDP in Africa, p.35. Nicole GNESOTTO(2015),CommAssNat in reflecting on the possible deployment of EU Battlegroups, saw this as cases which would never happen.

with the EEAS." It has "in fact become the logical counterpart to the Foreign Affairs Council, which allows the HRVP to deliver on her duty to assist the Council and the Commission in ensuring a comprehensive approach to EU external action, as indeed consistency in its implementation".[81]

The comprehensive approach to EU external action

The comprehensive approach was recently described in terms reading like a Weberian 'Ideal-Typus': If this were already reality, most reform debates would have become unnecessary.

This methodology starts with an inter-institutional and inter-departmental analysis of the root causes of potential conflict, the main actors, the trends, and the risks of action or inaction on the part of the EU. On this basis, a common strategic vision is being developed as the foundation for comprehensive EU action. Two points are central here. Firstly, the comprehensive approach systematises processes and mechanisms promoting continuous interaction and exchange between often segregated policy communities. This is essential, because it is often hard for the relevant expertise and intelligence to surmount the departmental walls within and between EU institutions. The model example of this is the Crisis Platform, which has been set up within the EEAS. In response to specific needs and crises, all relevant EU actors come together on this platform, i.e. crisis management institutions such as the EU Military Staff (EU MS), the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), as well as representatives of Commission departments such as ECHO, DG DEVCO55 and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI). Together, they will strive for a common understanding of the problem and a definition of a collective approach. Secondly, the comprehensive approach emphasises that no blueprints or standard solutions exist. It therefore takes concrete situations as its starting point, meaning that better use also needs to be made of the EU Delegations.[82]

Critical Views and the Beginning Reform Debate of 2014-15

Looking at the results of the CSDP until 2014, one can consider this state of affairs acceptable, a status quo which does not need to be changed. Or one can consider it unsatisfactory and demand a reform. In fact, the vast majority of those who speak out on these issues, be they soldiers or experts, and even certain officials, see important insufficiencies in this policy which needs to be changed to make it more effective.

Evidently this begs the important question of the benchmark against which the desired effectiveness is measured, of the size and nature of the gap perceived between that and the actual results, and of the variables which determine it.

These issues need to be taken up more systematically. But at this point the main arguments of the critical debate will just be assembled. They are mostly seen as 'blockades' preventing CSDP from being as effective as it should be.

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[81] BLOCKMANS, Steven & RUSSACK, Sophia (2015), The Commissioners' Group on External Action–Key political facilitator, CEPS Special Report, 17.12.2015. The report is very positive indeed on the improvements reached with the new format.

[82] MERKET, Hans (2015), The EU's comprehensive approach, p.22; Merket sees great difficulties to match deeds to words in this approach and continues two pages later:"it is not entirely clear what purpose the comprehensive approach ultimately serves", and "It is not clear how these systems affect policymaking in the relevant departments, workgroups and decision-making centres of the Commission, the Council and the EEAS"

Critical Views

Remaining Blockades

Divergent Security Concepts and Defence Postures

At the root of these *lacunae* lies the persisting divergence of security concepts and defence postures among EU MS, those between the biggest military powers, the UK, France and Germany having the most negative effects.

Unilateral Sovereign War-making

Common answers to threats continue to lack. France and the UK uphold the concept of a unilateral defence plus foreign intervention capacity, with a national nuclear deterrence at its core. As far as alliances and CSDP promise to support this national concept, they are sought, constructed, and used. Beyond that, they are resisted or sidelined. After 2010 (Lancaster House Treaty UK-F) both EU MS have concentrated much of their more demanding military and armaments cooperation between themselves, or joined up with the USA.

UK: For the UK this position is confirmed again in its 2015 Defence and Security Review[83]. The UK takes a pragmatic utilitarian approach to the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, trying to render it useful for, and prevent it from harming the more important Euro-Atlantic security alliance, and "ensuring that the EU's work supports UK priorities" (p.53). It participated only in a limited number of the 32 CSDP missions since 2003, for instance Althea, Atalanta, Sophia, sometimes ascribing to itself "a leading role in CSDP missions". In that spirit it also aims to foster closer coordination and cooperation between the EU and NATO.

France: For France, the other unilateralist, a somewhat more ideological or principled approach leads to analogous conclusions: The French Livre Blanc (2013, p.19) maintains that the Nation must remain able to protect its sovereignty. Otherwise "it loses the control of its destiny". Yes, for its security policy France has voluntarily entered into a system of interdependencies. But to be able to assume her contribution to this system, she has to retain in all circumstances "the autonomous capacity of assessing a situation, and the full independence of its decision and its action" (p.20; cf. also CHAUVEAU/GAYMARD).

France has propagated and co-initiated CSDP with the explicit intention to create a European counter-weight to (or at least a European pillar inside) NATO. Like the UK, it expects CSDP to support its own security vision and magnify its own weight. But even though CSDP has not become its choice method of military intervention, it has a much bigger place than is the case for the UK.

Already before the start of CSDP in 2003 –and since– France has concentrated by far the largest part of its national military efforts on Africa, including those where it participates in CSDP missions. The data show clearly that in that period alone:

- France concentrates its efforts increasingly on Africa and the Arabian Peninsula;
- The French model of security provision is a predominantly military one;
- This military orientation is strongest in French African and Arab security interventions;
- The military penchant is reduced in French foreign interventions on the European continent.

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[83] UK Government, Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street, Cabinet Office, Department for International Development, Foreign & Commonwealth Office,+ others (2015), The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, November 23, 2015 (Cm9161), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-and-strategic-defence-and-security-review-2015

- Only a third of French African and Arab security interventions is carried out inside of CSDP. The large majority (18 of 27) are French national missions or take place in the frameworks of large UN missions, now and then in other multilateral frames, for example with the African Union, NATO, or USA.

As to the seven ongoing (end 2015) CSDP-missions in Africa, French personnel participation in them is high. But the number of French national foreign interventions on that continent is much higher. This proportion is inverse for Europe where more than half the French foreign interventions are part of CSDP missions, and the orientation is much more civilian. But given that the number of French foreign interventions grows in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, and stagnates/shrinks elsewhere, they also tend to 'grow out of' CSDP missions[84], especially its branch.

The most recent cases were the engagements of France –and of the UK– first in autumn 2014 in the anti-Da'esh coalition war in Iraq, and a year later in extending this war onto Syrian territory, and finally of France for the intensification of its counter-Da'esh airstrikes after the Paris attacks of 13/14 November 2015.[85] The UK as well, and Germany, plus Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark unilaterally joined the counter-Da'esh coalition's air campaign, plus fifteen European states engaged in training the Kurds and Iraqis.[86]

The latest example for the continuity of these principles seemed to be France with President Hollande's first reaction to the terrorist 13/14 November 2015 attacks in Paris, speaking to the parliamentary congress on Monday 16 November, when he turned to the US, Russia and the UNSC, and to the EU, for support in France's planned military escalation against Da'esh. On the occasion of the EU defence ministers' Council on following Tuesday 17 November his defence minister Le Drian invoked article 42§7 of the EU Union Treaty to demand support of the other EU MS for a France under armed aggression from Da'esh (AFP 17.11.2015, 10h00).

This was the first time that that article, which has been considered more declaratory than serious up to then, was invoked. But the High Representative underlined that this was not a CSDP operation, "but an activation of bilateral aid and assistance."[87] The weeks of French counter-Da'esh coalition-building since then confirmed that unilateralist reading of the French initiative. As of end of November 2015, the French government has sidestepped what there might have been of collective defence connotations of its appeal to Art. 42§7, concentrating instead on bilateral efforts to build an ad-hoc-coalition with the biggest EU military powers UK and Germany, but especially with Russia and the United States, to cooperate more closely against Da'esh. Even so, Germany has reacted with a very substantial reinforcement of its contribution to France's war on terror, from air reconnaissance and in-flight refuelling over Syrian Da'esh territory, over a frigate protecting French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle in the Mediterranean, to a substantial reinforcement of the German detachment to Mali. But this would appear to be a German unilateral action in its turn, reacting to the French demand for help – confirming and continuing the basic logic of CSDP policy making.

On the CFSP/CSDP-side, there has been no effort, nor interest it appears, to use this EU policy framework to give a collective answer to the French appeal.

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[84] CHAUVEAU/GAYMARD, p.12, for individual missions

[85] In the UK, the government still prepares a parliamentary vote on this issue. France has –according to official information– begun airstrikes against Da'esh in Syria on Sunday 27.09.2015.

[86] DANJEAN, Arnaud (2015), contribution to Assemblée Nationale, July 1, 2015, p.5

[87] Outcome of the Council Meeting, 3426th Council meeting Foreign Affairs Brussels, 16 and 17 November 2015, Council doc.14120/15, p.6

Multilateralist Germany: If for the UK's and France's defence approach their national armed forces, intelligence and security agencies, and their foreign operations, stand in the centre, Germany, all in being the third co-founder of CSDP, takes the directly opposite approach. Its keyword is comprehensiveness, but with a very strong preference for the non-military tools and a half-blind eye for the military.

And if the unilateralist fibre strongly resonates through the UK's and France's defence approach, Germany is the paradigmatic multilateralist, refusing to take unilateral military initiatives or even to initiate CSDP missions. Itself it has up to 2015 not launched a single one of the 32 CSDP missions and operations. In the centre of its own approach stand institution-, concept- and procedure-building in Brussels, integrating all EU MS into these structures, prevention and capacity building in CSDP target countries.[88]

Germany has shed a lot of its former reticence vis-à-vis CSDP. The explanation seems to be that "Almost all of the CSDP missions and operation launched since 2012 aim at capacity building and/or the training of security forces. Compared to the period 2003-2008, Germany strongly engages itself in these missions and operations, both financially as through the deployment of civilian experts and military forces."[89] But there is no doubt that in concentrating on that line, Germany tends to "lose its most important ally, France"[90], which strikes out on its own or with other partners for the larger part of its external interventions (see infra).

With this position, Germany as well has an approach which is difficult to integrate into a common policy.

Internal Enablers

Has anything very relevant changed recently, concerning the CSDP's other weaknesses listed further up: the absence of permanent groups of closer defence policy cooperation – the absence of a military headquarters for CSDP – the CSDP's structural incapacity of rapid executive action in military intervention – the absence of EU funding for CSDP missions – the fragmentation of the EU's military instrument?

Most of those shortcomings have remained unchanged:

- Permanent groups of closer defence policy cooperation have not come about;
- A military headquarters for CSDP has not come any closer in the past two years;
- The CSDP's structural incapacity of rapid executive action in military intervention has even worsened with the UK's recent constitutional development;
- As to EU-Funding for CSDP missions at least the perspectives for the future have improved in certain areas, namely for using Development funds for defence capacity building in Africa;
- The fragmentation of the EU's military instrument has not been decisively reduced either, during the last two years.

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[88] KEMPIN, Ronja (2015), From reluctance to policy – A new German stance on CSDP ?, http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2015/01/reluctance-policy-new-german-stance-cdsp/;
[89] KEMPIN, Ronja (2015), ibid.
[90] Ibid

The Beginning Reform Debate for the EU's External Security Policy

Conceptualisation

In the year 2015, the widespread dissatisfaction with the CSDP highlighted further up, has led to a conceptual debate about its possible improvements, accelerated by the approaching submission of the HRVP's New Global Strategy, due in summer 2016. A number of important institutional actors has gone public with their ideas about how a new formulation of the EU's External Security and Defence Policy should look.

We have seen that Security and Defence Policy cooperation is shaped –and can be revised if the necessity is seen– by the EU MS governments, the two relevant Council formations, the *European Council* and the *Foreign Affairs and the Defence Council* chaired by their respective presidents, and the Commission with its President.

The most radical option that the Treaty proposes for re-shaping the EU's External Security and Defence Policy, is the shift towards a Defence Union (TEU Art.48§§2+3). For that case the *European Parliament* and the national parliaments would join the aforementioned actors. That shift is possible by an ordinary treaty revision procedure which may be initiated by a proposal of any MS government, of the Commission or the European Parliament, and if supported by a simple majority of the European Council, leads to the convocation of a Convention where these actors are supplemented by national parliamentarians. This step is also possible by a simplified procedure according to TEU Article 42§2. Here, the same actors come into play, with the exception of the European Parliament.

All of these first contributions seen by this author have a short diagnosis made up of the changes in context, by CSDP weaknesses and by the mainly institutional proposals.

For most of them the context is marked by the US' 'pivot' to Asia and by Russia's new military asser- tiveness. Both of these factors do in their opinion weaken NATO's credibility for its future as the EU MS' collective territorial defence alliance.[91] But in addition, the EPP detects a growing security challenge also in the new "Ring of fire" –a dramatic image also used by the ALDE– around Europe, rounded off in the South with "ISIS and other terrorist organizations … proliferating in the Middle East and North Africa, with instability in the Middle East, Libya and the security challenges posed by the Sahel in general". China's or Saudi-Arabia's massive armaments are denounced as indicators of future and more distant external security challenges.

CSDP weaknesses seen by the different contributors and their mainly institutional proposals will be sketched out in looking at them in turn.

Since the election of the new EP in 2014 and the selection of the new Commission president, himself an avowed advocate of a Defence Union, a review and reformulation of the Union's security policies has been underway. For Internal Security, an interim result has been reached by the European Coun- cil in summer 2015 (EUCO 22/15, 26.06.2015). Concerning the External Security policy, the European Council has mandated the HR/VP in June 2015 to submit a new EU Global Strategy on foreign and

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[91] This was a point very forcefully made by Nicole GNESOTTO (2015) in her contribution to Assemblée Nationale, July 1, 2015: "More crisis, less America, in a simple strategic equation that signifies more Europe".

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security policy by June 2016. A preparatory document of HRVP Mogherini's services has been published in June 2015.[92]

Commission President

In each of the two security policy fields, the European Commission has substantial direct stakes, most of all as concerns the tools of international security policy of which it controls most of the non-military ones (Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), including the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace IcSP). In addition, to determine or at least cooperate in the shaping of new Union policies is a core ambition of the European Commission since its creation.

Accordingly the Commission has produced the draft for a new Internal Security Strategy in summer 2015, the 'Agenda on Security', which it hoped (in vain) the European Council would endorse as the EU's new Internal Security Strategy. Concerning external security, President Juncker had in spring 2015 already, asked for a European Army, in order to "persuade Russia the bloc is serious about defending its values". A demand which was immediately disqualified as unrealistic by many media all over the EU and directly opposed by the UK government. But the German minister of defence Ursula von der Leyen agreed with Juncker, 'for the longer term' ... .[93]

In preparation of the June 2015 European Council which was to look at defence, Juncker had his internal think tank EPSC draw up a Strategic Note[94] on how to deepen EU cooperation in defence policy. This text has been conceived under the direction of Michel Barnier, Commissioner for the Internal Market but also Special Adviser on European Defence and Security Policy to the President. At the time of the Summit the proposal could not after all be seriously considered.[95] By the end of the year, this approach had been shelved.

Its authors appear to concentrate on the military aspects: They denounce "European shortfalls in military operations … clearly highlighted by recent experiences in Mali or the Central African Republic", or "critical shortages of key enablers like air-to-air refuelling or strategic lift".

Concerning their proposals, they appear to plot the "course towards a common Union defence policy", without explicitly calling their objective 'CSDP' or otherwise. But their choice of initial steps and references appear to point towards an 'effective CSDP', with the principal reform step in that direction being the implementation of Permanent Structured Cooperation, PESCO, among a significant number of the militarily most powerful MS. They do not explicitly differentiate between the reform needs for a collective territorial defence policy (NATO) and the expeditionary crisis management policy (CSDP). But their second important aspect takes account of that indirectly in resurrecting the old objective of a European Pillar within NATO.

A third aspect is to improve the division of labour between EU MS' armaments industries and to reach better economies of scale. Except the last, these are precisely those areas of Security and Defence policy over which the Commission has the least institutional competence and where its vision encroaches most on territory occupied by the intergovernmental policy making dominated by the Council.

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[92] Website of the upcoming new global strategy of the HR/VP: http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union. Cf. The European Union in a changing global environment. A more connected, contested and complex world.

[93] Cf. Jean-Claude Juncker calls for EU army, in: TheGuardian.com, 09 03 2015

[94] Analytical papers on topics chosen by the President of the European Commission. They are produced by the European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC), the European Commission's in-house think tank.

[95] Interview in the Commission EPSC on February 15, 2016

The president's concept is on the table, even if clearly premature and not in keeping with the Treaty text. It will be interesting to compare it with the HR/VP's Global Strategy in summer 2016.

HRVP

Looking at the above-mentioned preparatory document emanating from the 'EEAS Strategic Planning' Unit and the office of the HRVP may already give an idea about the direction taken by Ms. Mogherini.[96]

Its point of departure is the cohabitation of Foreign and Security Policy issues in one comprehensive document, nicely captured in the assertion that "We have a responsibility to protect our citizens while promoting our interests and universal values".

But in fact, 'The European Union in a changing global environment' is much more a presentation of context and challenges than of responses. For the latter there is a rather superficial general listing of structural problems to be solved in order to permit a more effective CFSP. Defence Policy and its institutional preconditions occupy only a marginal place in the last-but-two paragraph. Insofar the proposals of the Commission's Strategic Note would seem to fill an empty space next to the HRVP's preliminary reflections, without too much contradiction. But all depends on the trajectory taken by the two sides from there. After all, the HR/VP's earlier strong impetus in setting up EUMARFORMed/Sophia seemed to show a clear interest in organizing and applying the instruments of military coercion, an interest which might still translate into a willingness to set more concrete and perhaps different accents from what Barnier's team put on paper.

European Parliament

Foreign Affairs Committee

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the EP, in its 2015 report on the annual report of the HR gave strong endorsement to a proposal for reinforcing of the EU's security and defence policy in its turn, including the necessary link with the EU's internal security efforts.[97] It called on the June 2015 European Council to take "ambitious decisions", including (emphasis added):

- "Setting out the required capabilities and options for deepening defence cooperation in order to be able to better respond to the threats facing the countries of the EU";
- "Strengthening the European Defence Agency... so that it can play its full role in coordinating and stimulating armaments cooperation";
- "Prevent financial considerations from compromising the EU's ability to respond to crises";
- "Strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, inter alia by coordinating defence budgets, harmonising requirements, reducing inefficiencies and creating synergies";
- "Addressing existing problems in the area of the planning and conduct of military operations, including by establishing a permanent military operational headquarters"; and
- "Increasing the EU Battlegroups' effectiveness... and deploying the Battlegroups in future crisis management scenarios wherever appropriate".

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[96] Website of the upcoming new global strategy of the HR/VP: http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union. Cf. The European Union in a changing global environment. A more connected, contested and complex world.

[97] European Parliament EU, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Report on the Annual Report from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament (2014/2219(Ini)), Rapporteur Elmar Brok," (Brussels2015 03 03). A strong Committee majority including S&D MEPs supported the report

In insisting on these institutional points which it found especially urgent, the Committee was clearly closer to the Commission's Strategic Note than to EEAS' Global Strategy.

Parliamentary Groups

Two parliamentary groups have as well submitted, in 2014-16, a position advocating further integration of the EU's external security and its defence policy and institutions: the EPP[98] and the ALDE[99] Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe. ALDE's is perhaps the clearest proposal: For them, "in most cases the EU role can be summed up as too little, too late". Both appear to allude to issues related to shortfalls in employability and sufficiency of the military component. "Establish the European Defence Union (EDU) and mandate preparation of a roadmap towards EU Integrated Military Forces by 2025, built as a European pillar of NATO." Funding of missions should become European, a permanent Headquarters should be created, Armament planning and spending should be coordinated with a strong role for 'Pooling and Sharing'. Less succinctly and with some differences in detail, the EPP paper arrives at the same central elements of proposal. Neither of the two does explicitly differentiate between the reform needs for a collective territorial defence policy (NATO) and the EU's crisis management policy (CSDP), preferring an ambitious integrated solution.

Also in comparison to the texts put forward by the EPSC and the EP's Foreign Affairs Committee of Spring-Summer 2015, there are only small institutional differences. All four are very ambitious, stick to the elements which the Lisbon Treaty provides, all utilise the Treaty element PESCO to respond to the lack of conceptual consensus among the 28, certain combining it with external institutions, for example the Eurocorps[100], and all search the solution for future cohabitation with NATO in the pillar-concept being the favourite.

The Group of Socialists & Democrats have up to autumn 2015 not published any systematic position on the EU defence policy. The European Conservatives and Reformists ECR, third largest group in the European Parliament, hold the chairmanship of the EP's security and defence committee. In the face of increasing challenges. They "resist moves for greater EU integration" of external security and defence policy.[101]

One national position

The German Ministry of Defence has let media see a draft White Book text, earmarked for publication in July 2016.[102] In that text the positions of the EPSC Strategic Note are taken up with demands for using "all possibilities" available under EU treaties to establish deep co-operation between willing MS, to create a joint civil-military headquarters for EU operations, and a council of defence ministers, and to better co-ordinate the production and sharing of military equipment.

Assessment of a Preliminary Reform Debate

One can consider the 2016 situation of CFSP/CSDP acceptable, a status quo which does not need to be changed, even if it is not considered an optimal result of the cost and effort which it takes to uphold. Or one can consider it unsatisfactory, measured against the expectations or wishes one has for the future. Then, important variables to adapt will accordingly be: the size/quality and

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[98] EPP Group in the EP (2015), Position Paper: Towards a European Defence Union, November 2015, https://issuu.com/eppgroup/docs/epp_position_paper_defence_union_ (01.02.2016)

[99] ALDE (2015), Roadmap towards - EU Integrated Military Forces, http://www.alde.eu/documents/publications/

[100] http://www.daten.behoerdenspiegel.eu/esdu_22.pdf, see also VON WOGAU, in European Security and Defence, www.magazine-the-european.com A magazine of the Behörden Spiegel Group, Edition 3/2015

[101] http://ecrgroup.eu/policy/afet/

[102] Germany to push for progress towards European Army, in : FT 02. 05. 2016

composition, and the 'deployability', of the 'tool' CSDP at the disposal of the EU, and the relationship between CSDP and NATO, division of tasks or sharing.

Further up already it became clear that the majority of experts and practitioners consider CSDP to need improvements. Only very few voices seem to be there who would consider the 2016 situation of CFSP/CSDP acceptable.

Nevertheless, EU MS' political leaders have not, up to winter 2015-16, come up with common proposals to change CSDP structures, in public or in the EU Councils. Implicitly there is thus a strong consensus supporting this status quo. Only at the level of political parties and of the Commission where political entrepreneurs try to shape the future, among the military, and in the relevant think tanks, do many outspoken experts and officials or soldiers want to 'improve' CSDP, but mostly in military terms.

Causes of CSDP weaknesses in the past: Many participants in the debate deplore an 'ebb of voluntarism' since 2008, caused by the absorption of statesmen's attention and capacities by the financial and economic crisis. A second explanation sometimes concerns Russian aggression against the Ukraine, which has diverted –in the opinion of certain experts– all security attention in that direction and to NATO.[103] Since then the number and intensity of CSDP missions are supposed to have slumped. But in fact, looking at the number of missions and personnel deployed since then, the only drastic change is that the military component of CSDP missions deployed within Africa has shrunk from ca. 4900 personnel to ca. 2000 in 2015.

Unfortunately, reform proposals show little effort to learn lessons from the specific challenges confronted and results achieved –including these missions– in the first 13 years of CSDP. Rather, the EU-wide debate of many outspoken experts and practitioners simply turns to the future, to the challenges/contingencies one expects, and measured against the objectives one hopes to achieve. If and how more appropriate military action, in absolute terms or relative to the civilian component, would have helped to resolve Mali's or the CAR's problems, is not discussed. This aspect will be taken up in looking at the weaknesses of military solutions to security problems, further down.

Institutional and capacity improvements:
The main orientation turns to redress current shortages which impede appropriate military action and prevent success in 2015-16.

We have seen that for many actors the PESCO-articles 42§6 and 46, constitute a promising tool to improve the effectiveness of MS' military cooperation. But concerning their utility, together with the Protocol No.10, for this objective, doubts remain, because under PESCO the objective of this cooperation only concerns MS' military capacity building, and possibly reviewing their national decision-making procedures (cf. the very specific text of protocol 10, article 2, §§ a+c). As Sven Biscop (2011) wrote: "PermStrucCoop is not an end in itself, but a means towards generating more deployable forces."[104] "Deciding about military operations" is not permitted to it.[105] To help advance Security and Defence policy cooperation, re-enforced cooperation would have to be mutually agreed among a limited group of MS, aiming to enter into a closer cooperation on actual decision-making about and implementation of defence policy measures. But if that kind of agreement could already be achieved among certain EU MS, these might well prefer entering into

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[103] Ibid.

[104] BISCOP, Sven (2008), Permanent Structured Cooperation and the Future of ESDP, Egmont Paper 20, Brussels

[105] GNESOTTO, Nicole (2015), Commission Ass.Nat., July 1, 2015

either a 'normal' enhanced cooperation under the treaty according to Art. 326 ff. TFEU, or more probably extra-treaty cooperation, instead of submitting to a very constraining formula like PESCO, keeping them away from true advances.

NATO's coming Credibility Gap, new Challenges and new European Assertiveness as decisive Variables:

Finally, the advocates of a substantial 'improvement' of the CSDP's military tool apparently do not only want it for preserving the EU's own stability and security including Europe's vital supply lines against threats seen emanating from African and Arab civil wars and Balkan unrest, but also to impose European political-economic values and preferred outcomes in the European Neighbourhood, and perhaps even farther afield, eventually in alliance with the United States.

Even in looking at the NATO issue, reform advocates do not explicitly differentiate –neither in the EP's Foreign Affairs Committee, nor in the parliamentary groups, nor in the EPSC– between the reform needs for a collective territorial defence policy (NATO) on the one side, and the EU's crisis management policy (CSDP) on the other, preferring an ambitious sounding overall solution. CSDP's role in the EU MS' collective defence should become stronger and NATO's put into perspective. The advocates of reform do not see the future reduction of NATO's credibility refuted by NATO's and the US' strong 2015-16 reassurance demonstrations in the Baltic States and Central Europe. These are discounted as transient and bound to expire sooner or later. 'US pivots' and 'rings of fire' are seen to necessitate not only a very substantial improvement of the CSDP military component, but also a new sharing of tasks between NATO and CSDP.

How to react to this provisional sum-up of reform concepts?
'Europeanisation' of the EU MS' External Security Policy

Before addressing the proposed reform concepts, we need to check the results of our preceding analysis for answers to two other questions.

One is, in taking up the question asked in the introduction concerning the 'Europeanization' of the EU MS' 'Core Policies', whether a development of that kind can be identified for their 'External Security Policies'. Has their EU-level cooperation intensified and become more systematic, as compared to the other cooperation formats? Do they reach common 'External Security Policy' objectives more often and more regularly?

The answer of most experts and practitioners is negative. The repeated examination of a number of key criteria for this report has given a similar result. In the decade up to the end of 2015 then, that 'core policy' of EU MS has not seen tangible Europeanization. In comparison, unilateral and extra-EU coalition formats have been confirmed and strengthened.

Two, what can explain that negative (in relation to the question asked) result?

The decisive points have been underlined. The British and the French unilateralism in security and defence policy is a key variable, but also the German unwillingness to settle on less than it's own preferred European cooperation formats with France, before 2010.[106]

 The second and structurally even more decisive variable being the fact that even up to 2015, there was no true urgency pushing toward deeper and broader Europeanisation of security/defence,

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[106] MÜLLER, Nils (2014), Zwischen Pragmatismus und Passivität: Die GSVP-Politik der schwarz-gelben Koalition, in: STAACK, Michael & Dan KRAUSE, Eds. (2014), pp.207ff.

neither at the NATO-level, nor at that of CSDP, over and above what had been reached before 2010. What could then justify putting into jeopardy the time-proven structure that has served every one of them tolerably well, at each of the two levels?

Also, much cited incentives, supposed to encourage governments in overcoming these barriers, have been clearly over-estimated.

One is public opinion. Among social scientists there is no doubt that it can have an important role in enabling or even pushing democratic governments and other political actors into action, or in preventing them from doing so.

But looking at the data in Europe gives a contradictory result. The "most important concerns facing the EU" in spring 2015, according to the EU-wide standard Eurobarometer polls, were first 'immigration', second the 'economic situation', then 'unemployment', 'public finances', 'terrorism', and in seventh place 'crime'. Foreign threats did not figure on that list, neither military nor otherwise; their salience appears low in respondents' opinion. But on the other hand, when asked which policies should be dealt with at EU-level, polls regularly –including a recent one of September-October 2015 by 'Policy matters' – place foreign and security policy very high up on the ranking. But the conclusion cannot be that EU citizens have a high priority for common defence; rather, they place issues of low salience high on the EU's To-Do-list. That does not add up to be a strong incentive for CSDP, after all.[107]

Another supposed incentive has been the growing argument, in times of decreasing defence spending after the end of the Cold War, that a policy of 'sharing and pooling' defence assets and their procurement, and of agreed specialisation on specific defence tasks in certain countries, could result in more defence effectiveness for the combined forces of the EU, than the separated ones had before even with larger funding. [108]

But this is a justified expectation only on condition that the large MS' governments did actually look out for economies in defence rather than sovereign control over their defence. That is clearly not the case. In those governments' basic policy documents and their decisions over the last 24 months, there is no sign for that disavowal of the necessity and praxis of national and even unilateral defence.

Putting the reform debate and its urgency into perspective

Indeed, we need to put this reform debate and its urgency for EU MS into perspective. The first part of this report with the analysis of the EU MS' different defence cooperation frameworks –UN, NATO, uni-multilateral, CFSP/CSDP– enables us to do so. It has demonstrated that the EU MS' security/defence policies do not depend on only one single cooperation format. They are integrated into several of them at global and regional levels, which serve to stabilise their international environment and even offer a degree of welcome redundancy, to a point.

NATO

Secondly for dealing with the potentially most threatening external security challenges, those against their territorial integrity and too large for their national defence capacities, most EU MS prefer to rely

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[107] Cf. BRUMMER, Klaus (2007), 'Superficial, not Substantial: The Ambiguity of Public Support for Europe's Security and Defence Policy', in: European Security, Volume 16, Issue 2, 2007, pages 183-201

[108] For the pooling and sharing debate, cf. MÖLLING, Christian (2013), Wege aus der europäischen Verteidigungskrise. For the basic policy documents of France and the UK see UK Government (2015), The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review, and FRANCE (2013), Livre Blanc. Défense et Sécurité Nationale

on NATO. This defence alliance does to all appearances function and its most credible and valuable alliance partner –the USA– remains willing to assume its alliance obligations. And this is in any case not an EU MS that can be bound into an EU-level reform treaty.

For the kind of coercive reaction which the EU CFSP should itself carry out, i.e. sanctions, leaders see the Union as fully capable and successful actor. And concerning the strength and military readiness of the EU's NATO members, they hold the key in their own hands, even without any additional organizational reforms at NATO level: raise defence budgets to NATO's defence spending goal of 2% of GDP, a goal which is presently only reached by 5 of 28 MS, including the US, whereas 11 of them spend only 1% or less. The new Russian assertiveness and massive re-armament over the past years, has had practically no effect on defence spending.[109]

As to the Alliance's own debates about reorganisation and re-positioning in Central Europe, the EU's NATO members participate fully. As to defining or imposing a common position vis-à-vis their trans-atlantic partner to strengthen their influence, most national European decision-makers appear neither ready nor willing to do so.

CSDP

The vector, in which the EU MS do and can act among themselves to adapt and advance in mutual defence cooperation, is the CSDP. The preceding analysis has shown that that vector is narrow. It is increasingly oriented towards a limited geographical theatre –Africa– and deals with a limited assortment of crisis management missions concerning low-medium intensity conflict potential. In addition, the major and growing part of its missions is civilian.

At that level, MS like France or UK often prefer to act on their own with partners of their choice, for instance the USA again, if their interests are engaged. NATO is developing, with the participation, to be sure, of EU MS, a certain presence in Africa in its turn.

And here the EU MS' other big security partner network, the United Nations, with sometimes large EU MS' military participation, has established a big crisis management presence vastly over-towering that of the EU CSDP and dealing with the largest challenges in the same regions as the latter. As to the CSDP in a narrow sense, the report has shown that the most knowledgeable experts and soldiers do not consider the EU's external security policy to lack in adequate institutions and procedures, or even capacities, to carry out the tasks of crisis management, increasingly in Africa which is the essential objective of CSDP, within the established Treaty frame. Important improvements of employability and effectiveness are considered useful, to be sure. But their utility must not be overestimated.

In consequence, it does not appear evident that the EU MS really need to make a big effort to strengthen their common military capacities and reactivity in that field: the far-reaching reforms demanded for the CFSP/CSDP structures –even given all the latter's avowed lacunae– do not appear of first urgency for improving the EU MS' security.

The result of the first assessment is thus, that drastic efforts to strengthen the CSDP's military cooperation framework, of the kind proposed in many of the recent contributions, do not, in 2016, appear urgent. Secondly, where a military strengthening might indeed appear necessary, vis-à-vis Russia, within the NATO, very little political willingness exists up to 2015, to take that step.

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[109] http://www.wsj.com/articles/nato-calls-for-rise-in-defence-spending-by-alliance-members-1434978193

Upgrade CSDP

If the urgency for reforming CSDP, especially by adding military clout, is not high, the EU can afford to take some more time for an approach that could be called 'upgrading': reach better results without dramatic military strengthening measures.

Based on the results of the first part of this report, and on the proposals made since 2015 –and assuming a status-quo scenario as to CSDP's place in EU MS' security and defence policy– this could be reached by a limited and clearly circumscribed reform of CFSP/CSDP structures.

As to that reform, the preliminary contributions of the political reform debate have *grosso modo* concentrated on a number of institutional and capacity issues concerning the military tool of CSDP: the absence of permanent groups of closer defence policy cooperation – the absence of a military headquarters for CSDP – the CSDP's structural incapacity of rapid executive action in military intervention – insufficient EU funding for CSDP missions – the fragmentation of the EU's military instrument.

There are several problems concerning that approach, the discussion of which requires to take one step back from CSDP's institutional and operational issues.

The first of the problems results from the absence of a permanent cooperative approach in external security and defence, in CFSP and is located in the juncture between CFSP and CSDP. It concerns the manner in which the EU's Foreign and Security Policy institutions advance from the joint analysis, evaluation and diplomatic treatment of a crisis situation, to the consideration and then the decision to launch a mission of crisis management, be it military or/and civilian.

 This juncture has two aspects which remain problematic and which have both already been highlighted.

One refers back to the lacking differentiation between the reform needs for a collective territorial defence policy (NATO) on the one side, and the EU's crisis management policy (CSDP) on the other. It concerns the point at which MS decide between either remaining in an EU logic and step from CFSP to coordinating themselves under the CSDP flag, or stepping out of the EU as it were, and into the cooperation under the NATO flag.

For instance, in the above-cited paper by Pierre Vimont (2015, p.5), the author advocates a "more assertive mind-set" for the EU's CFSP and more courageous priority setting, and as a priority region he proposes for example Eastern Europe, as part of the EU neighbourhood. To be coherent, a CFSP strategy for that region would have to include an answer to the Eastern Europeans' security worries vis-à-vis Russia. But as it is, the EUMS hand over to NATO once their security policy cooperation under CFSP steps over to a security/defence cooperation, and in doing so they simultaneously take a large step out of a CFSP strategy. This must harm its coherence and credibility. The other aspect refers back to French unilateralism in foreign military missions. Here one Member State unilaterally steps out of (for instance) a joint CFSP crisis monitoring policy, and initiates a military intervention vis-à-vis that same crisis. A familiar French complaint in CSDP is that other EU MS would not join France in such missions, mainly in Africa[110], to which the others answer that they would hesitate to join in military missions in the deciding and planning of which they did not themselves participate before. French officials will retort that they could not divulge French contingency

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plans to governments whom they did not know already beforehand to be willing to join up. Without more explicit, more candid and comprehensive joint strategic preparation of crisis management policy, which addresses this difficult juncture, this kind of 'accident' between diplomacy and planning, and taking action, will regularly happen to CSDP and harm its coherence and credibility.

Mutatis mutandis this consideration also applies to the less-than-perfect implementation of the comprehensive approach in CSDP.

The persisting need for a more comprehensive approach

The results of applying military coercion to crises in Europe, Arabia, and mainly Africa, are not at all so convincing as to justify the improvement of that tool alone! The evaluation which French experts themselves, representing the political mainstream, give of the effects of (French) military operations in Africa, the avowed model for many advocates of CSDP-improvement, is negative. FROMION&ROUILLARD (2014) speak of the "*mirage du règlement militaire des crises*".[111] CHAUVEAU &GAYMARD (2015) conclude that when considering an armed intervention, one must not expect more than modest and limited results: military success is definitely no guarantee for political stabilisation afterwards, and one must also keep their potentially destructive effects, as seen in Libya and Iraq, in mind.

One of their principal lessons learnt from those experiences is (p.67), that sufficiently powerful and acceptable local political actors must always be identified and available for crafting a credible political solution of the crisis, permitting future French expeditionary forces to exit after an intervention.

This last-mentioned principle should –in the opinion of this author– also be an important consideration in the planning of CSDP missions, even though only the smaller part of them is military.

In principle then, a politically more circumspect approach that utilises non-military policy tools of the European Community in a comprehensive manner, aside the military ones supplied by the MS, appears to be the right answer to these problems. All the above-cited preliminary reform papers put their finger on this important problem. But none of them has taken a closer look at the issue or proposed a solution. They rather concur with each other in demanding the decisive guidance on that issue from the HRVP, in summer 2016.

Blockmans' above-cited research results about a sensible recent improvement of that coordination do not convince everybody, many others see large additional reform needs. In fact, soldiers, diplomats and also experts have also claimed that in 2015 the global (or comprehensive) approach of the EU remains largely a slogan, because of persisting administrative stove-piping and rigidities.[112]

How to better implement the comprehensive approach
For improving the functioning and the utility of CSDP as such, tangible improvements on these issues appear necessary. First, all intra-EU administrative and institutional measures must be further accelerated, which enable the systematic and effective introduction of the EU's civilian assets in all types of CSDP missions, each mission mainstreaming the priority objective of politically sustainable outcomes without prolonged military CSDP presence. These objectives can be helped by:

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[111] CHAUVEAU&GAYMARD (2015), p.28f., and 72f., on the strength of a very large number of auditions in expert, officials' and military circles; FROMION&ROUILLARD (2014), p.259 ff.
[112] CHAUVEAU/GAYMARD(2015), p.71; cf. similar criticism by MERKET, Hans (2015), The EU's comprehensive approach, p.24; cf. also VIMONT (2015)

- Further adapting the implementation procedures of certain of the so-called 'foreign policy instruments' to the imperatives of military missions; make FPI funding available for security sector reforms including the military sector;
- Creating a Civil–Military Headquarters for CSDP.

A first-order condition of success on that front is a timely and truly joint strategic preparation (by strategic papers or frameworks) and decision-making on the joint deployment of forces and the coordination of military and civilian assets. More consensus on the utility and practical applicability of the EU's comprehensive approach is needed as well in that context.

Harnessing French Unilateralism and UNSC permanent member position

But, all in emphasising the importance of doing away with Institutional impediments the different reform proposals sidestepped the most important ones among them: the security/defence unilateralism of France[113] and the UK. De facto, it is only France which remains available as partner in that respect and the problem is its clinging to retain autonomous control of deciding on and of handling its external operations, including those within CSDP missions. As long as France holds on to that line, taking part in or even strengthening a procedure of timely common consultation about an EU security contingency and the implementation of a jointly decided and more comprehensive CSDP-strategy appears very difficult to do for it.

France's veto voice in the UNSC (together with the UK) also continues to be a heavy if less discussed liability for trustful eye-to-eye agreements within the CFSP/CSDP decision-making bodies. There is an old debate about how to do away with that problem, a debate which cannot be taken up at this point. But that a satisfying solution has not been reached is shown by a recent opinion of the EP's Constitutional Committee, calling "for the necessary negotiations, procedures and reform of the UN Security Council to be carried out to enable the EU to become a permanent member of that body, with one permanent seat and one single vote." [114]

Perhaps the negotiations about the CSDP-reforms most wanted by France could help to 'harness French unilateralism' for the benefit of improving CSDP? For instance, the agreement on a CSDP Headquarters, and on Community funding for larger shares of CSDP cost could be leveraged vis-à-vis Paris, in the quest for its support for a systematic procedure of timely common decision-making on the joint deployment of forces and the coordination of military and civilian assets, and for its joining a deepened consensus on the utility and practical applicability of the EU's comprehensive approach. But it may well prove impossible to include France in more meaningful advances of coordination along those lines, if these were implemented at the EU Foreign Affairs Council level and in systematic manner. Even the formation of a meaningful central coalition of the willing (PESCO) could prove unattainable, given deep 'philosophical' divergencies between France and Germany, the principal military powers on the Continent. Dick ZANDEE has been among those who proposed to revert to subregional groupings of common interest under these circumstances[115].

Strengthening CSDP's Military Tool further

In the logic of this analysis, it is only in a next step that EU MS should make an effort to strengthen CSDP's military tool further by improving coordination in other fields, most importantly for EU-

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[113] Defended also by CHAUVEAU/GAYMARD(2015), for example p.30

[114] Opinion of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, on a Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on the role of the EU within the UN – how to better achieve EU foreign policy goals, of 15.09.2015, PE 560.600v03-00 A8-0308/2015

[115] ZANDEE, Dick, Ed. (2015), EU as a Security Actor in Africa

funding of CSDP missions, and for reducing the fragmentation of the EU's military instrument, especially in making the Battlegroups available for CSDP missions. Interesting proposals for that last objective have come from Janusz ONYSZKIEWICZ, former Polish Defence Minister.[116] Of essential importance is also the more rapid availability of national force contributions to CSDP missions for which a harmonized lowering of EU MS' parliamentary hurdles is suggested. " As the role of parliaments in some countries is crucial in deciding on the deployment of troops (e.g. in Germany, Spain and the Netherlands) and is becoming more prominent in others (e.g. in the United Kingdom ….), they have to be engaged during the whole process". National initiatives in certain MS are already underway and promise to be difficult.[117]

Can the Foreign Challenges to Internal Security Provide a Glue for better Cooperation in CSDP?

In introducing this section on Reform Initiatives for EU External Security Policy, we underlined the importance that dramatic new EU security contingencies could have for generating new political support in EU MS, for further deepening of cooperation in CFSP/CSDP. Further up the irruption of Internal Security Objectives into CSDP missions in Africa and on the Arabian Peninsula, was highlighted as that kind of a contingency.

In contrast to classical external security threats, like the 'Russian menace', these internal security challenges like for instance added smuggler-supported irregular migration pressure against the EU's external border system, or the expansion of African and Arabic radical islamist terrorism to Europe, do have high salience for Europeans and strong effects in public opinion.[118] Taken together with Europeans' persisting preference for having security issues dealt with at EU level, these polls do give incumbent governing parties the chance to interpret the *EU Internal Security* effects of Arabian-African developments as requiring *EU External Security* responses in that region, and to exploit that fact against the nationalist security policies proposed by the right-wingers. That might become an incentive for a number of EU governments to advance further in this terrain than they would otherwise have done.

CFSP/CSDP Reform and Relations to NATO

Will a grading-up of the CSDP's structure and its military tool by closer, more reliable, better funded, coordination of larger parts of EU MS' militaries, as intended by reform proposals, by itself already enhance EU MS' collective war fighting capacities in the NATO vector of their defence, and thus increase CSDP's joint weight vis-à-vis NATO in the manner which the majority of these proposals seem to expect?

That is not at all a foregone conclusion, given the separation between the CSDP vector, and the NATO vector of the EU MS' defence policy, and the differences between the two in terms of their legal foundations and mode of cooperation, their missions, their military tool kit, as they present themselves to today's European decision-makers. There would appear to be much room for EU MS' military capacities and their cooperation under CSDP to improve and become more fit for CSDP's

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[116] ONYSZKIEWICZ, Janusz (2015), 'Finding a use for the European Union Battle Groups', Europe's World, Web exclusive, October 28 2015

[117] For a comparison of EU MS, cf. CLINGENDAEL (2016), Food-For-Thought Paper 'The Parliamentary Dimension of Defence Cooperation', 14.-15.03.2016, p,3. For Germany, cf. the proposed amendment of the law regulating the Federal parliament's prerogatives in authorising foreign deployment of German armed forces, first reading in February 2016, cf. http://www.ndr.de/info/sendungen/streitkraefte_und_strategien/Weniger-Parlamentsrechte-bei-Auslandseinsaetzen,streitkraefte376.html

[118] Mainstream parties have learned that at their cost in the years of maximum terrorist attacks and migration pressure, on the occasion of German Länder-parliaments' elections in 2014-15-16 when the populist right-wing AfD moved into parliaments from the start with two digit results. Or take Austria where all Länder with elections in 2015 saw a massive strengthening of the right-wing FPÖ results. And in France the first leg of regional elections of December 2015 saw the right-wing Front National gain, with over 27%, the largest voter share of all participating parties.

circumscribed and probably increasing military tasks, before they start to 'change weights' also on NATO's scales.

The report has shown that NATO starts to reinforce its territorial defence capacities in Central Eastern Europe since Russia's aggression against Ukraine. EU MS appear even to head for their first increase in defence spending since 2008, forecast for 2016[119].

 A second important variable is the future of the EU MS' African military engagements under the NATO flag, started since 2005 (see further up). Will this remain a passing experience with their NATO cooperation re-centring on Europe, or is it meant to continue and in that manner supplement the CSDP flag in Africa? Again, the logic of 2014-15-16 defence politics seems to plead for the Europe re-centring option.

In consequence, NATO appears to be set for a strengthening of its military capacities, and of its political role in EU MS' defence policy cooperation. NATO and CSDP appear set perhaps for more cooperation but also for re-defining a clearer delimitation of each other's principal mission.

Both developments are bound to increase the distance which CSDP reform would have to cover for increasing CSDP's joint weight vis-à-vis NATO and permit it to create a more united and militarily more powerful European pillar in that alliance.

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[119] Defence spending by Nato's Europe states up as uncertainty rises, Financial Times, May 30, 2016

Concluding Remarks

Clearly, EU MS' overall External Security Policy has shown a remarkable resisting power vis-à-vis integration advances within the EU frame. Only the narrow CSDP-vector of that policy has in the past advanced in that direction.

The report has highlighted that this advance could not gain much overall impact because the development was also shaped by additional and powerful regional and global cooperation formats in that policy field (NATO, United Nations, ad-hoc coalitions) in which EU MS engaged as well. But the developments of the second decade of the 21st century do not even permit to uphold much positive judgment in the narrow CSDP vector any longer, given old institutional blockades and new political challenges within and outside of the security and defence sector (Russian aggressiveness, the public debt and economic crisis) making themselves felt. Indeed the resistance of governments to the evident advantages of more sharing and cooperation in defence, even in times of dire and shared financial need, is proof for the political weight of national governments' very deeply ingrained and intrinsically political aversion against going down that path. Governments lacked incentives as well from the functional side as from public opinion, sufficiently strong to compensate for these remaining and newly emerging disincentives and to advance in EU cooperation of External Security Policy.

This constellation may change since the very recent confluence of a clearly increased and foreign-inspired terrorist threat with a massive challenge to the EU's system of external borders and their security. A dramatically increased irregular immigration, and the EU's inability to share this load internally, has become a widely discussed topic of popular and of elite political discourse and discussion. Here, important elements of internal security –which resonate much stronger with most EU national public opinions than external security– enter into the EU External Security Policy equation.

Engaged in the middle of a wide-ranging evaluation and reform initiative for their Security and Defence Policy, the EU institutions and national governments seize on this opportunity in 2016. Nevertheless it remains to be seen whether the new EU level External Security Policy responses (like the EU-Turkey refugee deal), to basically Internal Security challenges, are sustainable. And it remains to be seen whether and how much an intensification of cooperation in CFSP/CSDP, around these topics, can contribute to a further Europeanization of the EU MS' External Security policies in general.

The benchmarks for measuring EU integration of its MS' External Security Policy

This report introduced two benchmarks for measuring EU integration of its MS' External Security Policy: normative and pragmatic.

The normative benchmark as set by the Lisbon Treaty is split and contradictory, between the vision of a European Defence Union destiny on the one hand, on the other the prescribed coexistence of two regional security and defence cooperation formats, crisis management in CSDP and collective territorial defence in NATO.

The empirical benchmark on the other hand stipulates one unified armed force and one security and defence policy for one federal state. The empirical benchmark thus concurs with the first visionary normative benchmark.

The report has shown that a large part of the political actors and most experts measure actual advances of EU External Security Policy against a benchmark combined of the 'visionary' normative

and the empirical benchmark. In consequence, their analysis as to actual integration advances in this field is very negative and their reform demands become inconsistent with the path chosen so far. Measured against the alternative benchmark combined of the normative CSDP-plus-NATO component and the empirical component, EU External Security Policy advances still fall short of many expectations drawn from the latter, but they do concur much better with the admittedly contradictory overall benchmark demands. Analysis as to integration advances in this field does not remove those contradictions, but the application of this benchmark does permit to see the advances that are, in a less negative light and even give them some credit for very limited progress of integration.

For its own evaluation, this report has adopted that second benchmark, including its contradictions. The report's reading of the first round of proposals for the reform of EU External Security Policy has been done in that spirit and its results are in consequence more consistent with the path chosen so far by the EU MS. They are also, we think, more realistic.

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